Online Appendix

Revealing Zero-sum Thinking in the United Kingdom*

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1 Additional Analysis

For completeness, we collate additional results for survey questions not discussed in the main text but covered in our pre-analysis plan. These relate to four classes of analysis: (i) additional results for White British respondents; (ii) a comparison of responses of White British and minority respondents; (iii) heterogeneous impacts of the narratives on White British respondents by political leaning, gender and education; (iv) perceptions of White British respondents towards other minority groups that are not named in either narrative treatment.

1.1 Perceptions Towards Minorities as a Whole

To begin with, Table OA1 shows that White British respondents slightly overestimate the minority share of the population (34% versus 26% as calculated from the 2021 census), and this overestimate is slightly increased, by 1.8pp, in response to the narrative of disadvantage. Table OA2 describes how in the control group of White British respondents, individual characteristics correlate with perceptions towards minorities as a whole, causes of disadvantage for minorities, and policy responses to reduce economic inequalities by race/ethnicity. At the foot of each Column we report the share of respondents agreeing with each statement.

Ethnic Inequality and Diversity We first consider whether respondents think ethnic inequalities are a big/moderate problem. Column 1 of Table OA2 shows that 62% of respondents hold this view, and it is more prevalent among women and higher educated respondents. Column 2

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additionally then controls for political leaning. This slightly weakens the partial correlation with education, but political leaning is the characteristic most substantially and significantly correlated with this view of ethnic inequalities, all else equal. Compared to the omitted group of left-leaning respondents, centrist respondents are 24pp less likely to view ethnic inequalities as a big/moderate problem, and right-leaning respondents are 36pp less likely to do so. Columns 3 and 4 repeat the analysis for whether the respondent agrees that ethnic diversity generally has a positive impact on life in the UK. 45% of respondents overall hold this view, and the perception is more commonly held among educated and higher income individuals. From Column 4 we again see the strength of association of this view with political leaning: compared to the omitted group of left-leaning respondents, centrist respondents are 36pp less likely to view ethnic diversity positively, and right-leaning respondents are 68pp less likely to do so.[1]

Causes On causes of ethnic disadvantage, we asked respondents whether they view racial discrimination as a big/moderate problem. Column 5 of Table OA2 shows that 63% of respondents hold this view, with this being more prevalent among women. From Column 6 we see that while women and older individuals are more likely to view racial discrimination as a big/moderate problem, political leaning has a stronger association with this view: compared to the omitted group of left-leaning respondents, centrist respondents are 33pp less likely to view discrimination as a big/moderate problem, and right-leaning respondents are 61pp less likely to do so.

Policy Responses We asked individuals whether they agreed that government should aim to reduce economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families. Columns 7 and 8 of Table OA2 show that 49% of respondents agree with this, with younger, female, and more educated respondents being more likely to agree. Partial correlations with political leaning are precisely estimated and substantial: compared to left-leaning respondents, centrist respondents are 26pp less likely to agree, and right-leaning respondents are 53pp less likely to agree.

Summary The views of the average White British individual are on average quite progressive. In line with existing evidence, views are more progressive among the young, women, and more educated. However, the averages mask cleavages by political leaning. On each dimension, left-leaning, centrist and right-leaning respondents have significantly different perceptions from each other. As a result, on some outcomes there is almost zero support among right-leaning individuals (e.g. whether ethnic diversity has a generally positive impact on life). Table OA3 shows these conclusions are robust to alternative measures of political leaning based on past or intended future voting behaviors. The results echo the literature on attitudes towards Black-White racial gaps

[1] Those unsure of their political leaning (or don't knows) are included in the specifications. At the foot of each even Column we report the p-value on a Wald test of the equivalence of the coefficients on covariates shown.

in the US, in that the political leaning of respondents is strongly associated with perceptions of minorities [Haaland and Roth 2023, Alesina *et al.* 2024].[2]

We next consider how perceptions of minorities as a whole are shifted by the narratives. The results in Table OA4 demonstrate that narratives do not shift attitudes towards ethnic diversity being positive for life in the UK, but they do shift views on discrimination as a big/moderate problem. Relative to controls, the narrative of disadvantage is more impactful than the narrative of success. Exposure to the narrative of disadvantage rather than that of success also weakens the widely-held view that immigration should be reduced ($p = .043$), though the narrative of success reduces further the view that immigration should be increased, relative to controls.

1.2 Societal Contribution

We asked respondents whether each group generally makes a positive or negative contribution to the UK, on a scale where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 means 'very positive'. The question is designed to be a catch-all that encompasses perceptions of both economic and non-economic (cultural) contributions. The results for White British respondents are in Table OA5. Among controls, the perceived contributions of all outgroups are above the midpoint of the scale, so each group is viewed as contributing positively to UK society. Pakistanis are perceived to provide the lowest contribution (5.1), followed by Black Caribbeans (5.6) and then Indians (6.1), with the White British ingroup scoring 7.3. Neither narrative significantly shifts the perceived contribution of any outgroup, suggesting these views of others are somewhat ingrained within the majority.

1.3 Economic Outcomes

We explored majority perceptions of economic outcomes over a third dimension: group ranking of income, for both men and women. Responses are coded so a rank of 1 (6) means the group is perceived to have the highest (lowest) average income. Figure OA1 summarizes evidence from White British controls, where we find the perceived income rank of White British (and Polish) men and women tend to be overestimated (relative to what is measured in the QLFS), while for some minorities they are underestimated. Table OA6 shows treatment effects on this outcome. The narrative of success significantly shifts down the perceived ranking of the majority population (so towards being ranked 6), while the narrative of disadvantage pushes perceptions of the ingroup ranking in the opposite direction – both in line with zero-sum thinking. The lower panel shows

[2]For the backward-looking measure based on voting in 2019, we generally find few statistically significant differences between those that voted for the right-leaning Conservative Party and the (further right-leaning) Brexit Party. This changes when we measure political views using forward-looking voting intentions in the upcoming 2024 General Election. On that measure, for two out of four perceptions we find statistically significant different views between those intending to vote for the Conservative and Reform Parties. Views towards minorities might thus be becoming more polarized over time.

perceived income ranks of women across groups. The narrative of disadvantage shifts down the ranking of Pakistani women, one of the groups named in the narrative.

1.4 Other Domains of Discrimination

Tables OA7a and OA7b illustrate the impact of the narratives on perceptions of discrimination across six areas of life: at work, in contact with the police, in housing, in medical care, at school, and in public spaces. Respondents were randomly assigned to answer questions on three of these six domains. We find: (i) among White British controls, around 20% to 40% perceive minorities to 'often' face discrimination across domains, while around 7% perceive the ingroup to often face discrimination in most domains, though this increases to around 17% for housing; (ii) perceptions of discrimination faced by minorities at work significantly increase for respondents exposed to the narrative of disadvantage – with the magnitudes of impact being of economic significance; (iii) on the whole, neither treatment impacts perceptions of discrimination faced in other domains.

1.5 Policy

Equal Opportunities Policy We asked about views on equal opportunities policies – those targeted towards specific groups, which might include positive action or ensuring equality of access through diversity and inclusion initiatives. We asked respondents whether such policies have 'gone too far' or 'not gone far enough' in relation to each group. The results are in Table OA8. Among White British controls, 24% think such policies have not gone far enough for the ingroup, and only 4% think they have gone too far. Views towards minorities are more evenly split: for Indians, Pakistanis and Black Caribbeans, around 20% of respondents think such policies have gone too far, and a similar share think they have not gone far enough. These views can be shifted by the narratives: (i) the narrative of disadvantage increases the view that such policies have not gone far enough for each minority, by 3.6pp to 4.5pp; (ii) the effects of the narrative of success on this view are close to zero, so the effects of the two narratives differ significantly for Indians ($p = .017$) and Pakistanis ($p = .023$); (iii) both narratives slightly increase the view that such policies have gone too far for the White British, by around 2pp from a base of 4%. Hence we see no evidence of zero-sum responses when it comes to attitudes towards equal opportunities policies.

Non-targeted Policies As an alternative to targeted policies, general policies addressing root causes may be as effective and/or command greater support. We therefore asked respondents how much difference government could make in reducing ethnic inequalities through four broader policies, chosen to capture distinct underlying orientations: investing in education and training (likely to appeal to those with meritocratic perspectives); financially supporting families with children (to those concerned with redistribution and poverty); increasing penalties for discrimination (to those who see inequalities as deriving from discrimination); and teaching children about British

values (to those who see group cleavages in terms of failures of cultural integration). The results are in Table OA9. We find broad support for non-targeted policies – far more so than for equal opportunities policies. Investing in education and training receives the strongest support: 70% of respondents think it could make a great deal or fair amount of difference, while only 19% think it would make not much or no difference. The other three policies are each supported by between 48% and 52% of respondents, but each has a sizeable share of respondents (between 36% and 39%) who think it would make not much or no difference. The narratives shift support for some of these policies. The narrative of success significantly increases support for teaching children about British values, by 7.1pp.

Immigration and Other Policies Given that attitudes to immigration and ethnic diversity are typically inter-related, and that immigration was salient in public debate around the time of our survey, we asked respondents their views on immigration policy. We were interested if these views were differentiated by where immigrants were coming from. In line with providing factual information, we informed respondents of the five origin countries with the greatest current inflows into the UK at the time of the survey: India, Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. Two of these origins relate to minority groups with long histories of migration to the UK, and which we use in our narratives – India and Pakistan. For each of the five origin countries, we asked respondents their view on what should happen to the levels of immigration. We focus here on responses that numbers should be reduced, or numbers should be increased (rather than kept the same or don't know).

The results are in Table OA10. The majority of White British respondents think immigration numbers should be reduced irrespective of migrants' country of origin. For any given origin, support for immigration numbers being reduced is around ten times higher than for immigration flows to be increased. Narratives nudge these views slightly. Exposure to the narrative of success increases the view that immigration numbers should be reduced – perhaps because it triggers concerns over competition with migrants; exposure to the narrative of disadvantage nudges support the other way – perhaps laying such concerns to rest. As a result, there are differential effects of the narratives of success and disadvantage on the view that immigration numbers should be reduced from Pakistan ($p = .048$), Nigeria ($p = .054$), China ($p = .004$) and Zimbabwe ($p = .046$). The only exception is for immigration numbers from India, the group explicitly named in the narrative of success (and not in the narrative of disadvantage).[3]

We also asked questions on policy unrelated to ethnic inequalities, to capture broader orientations towards the state and public spending. Table OA11 details views of the aims of government policy. The narrative of disadvantage increases agreement and reduces disagreement with the statement that government should reduce ethnic inequalities.

[3]This differential impact is interesting given that studies of attitudes towards immigration typically finds those who are seen as being less likely to be in work are strongly penalized [Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015].

Table OA12 details views of policy priorities, unrelated to ethnic inequalities. The narrative of success increases support for spending on defence/national security, and transport infrastructure, while the narrative of disadvantage reduces support for polices to provide decent housing for all, or to improve the conditions of the poorest neighborhoods.

1.6 White British and Indian Respondents

While we cannot examine in detail the ways different minority groups respond to the survey, compared to the majority, our nationally representative sample does include a sufficiently large sample of one of the largest minorities, Indians, to enable us to explore and compare their responses.

Table OB1 compares how White British and Indian respondents view themselves and each other. Panel A shows that both groups view the societal contribution of the White British similarly, but Indians view their own contribution significantly more positively than does the majority (8.0 versus 6.1, $p = .000$). On economic outcomes, Indian respondents perceive higher graduate shares for both groups than White British respondents do, and a higher employment rate for their own group. Hence the perceptions of Indians are closer to reality for their own group than the perceptions the majority hold of Indians.

Panel B shows the two groups hold relatively similar views of the opportunities available to each group. The only difference is that no Indian respondents think White British individuals lack opportunities to earn a decent wage, while 16% of White British respondents think so of their ingroup. On causes of disadvantage, Panel C shows the groups again hold relatively similar views, except that 43% of Indian respondents attribute a lack of success among Indians to bad luck, compared to 24% of White British respondents ($p = .022$). Panel D shows that the groups diverge most on equal opportunities policies, with each thinking such policies have not gone far enough for their own group, and gone too far for the other: 45% of Indian respondents think such policies have not gone far enough for Indians (versus 18% of White British respondents), while 25% think they have gone too far for the White British (versus 4%).

Table OB2 considers how views of non-targeted policies differ between the two groups, and how each responds to the narratives. Among controls, Indian respondents are more supportive of investing in education and training ($p = .064$) and of financially supporting families with children ($p = .000$), suggesting a degree of self-interested reasoning given Indians' educational success and their greater likelihood of living in families with children. Indian respondents exposed to the narrative of success – which informs them Indians are performing well in education – become significantly less supportive of financially supporting families with children (by 30pp), entirely closing the gap with White British respondents. Unlike White British respondents, Indian respondents do not shift their support for teaching children about British values in response to the narrative of success. However, Indian respondents exposed to the narrative of disadvantage – which does not mention Indians, but informs them that other minorities face higher unemployment –

increase their support for teaching children about British values by 23pp (48% of the Indian control mean), overtaking support among White British respondents and reaching the level among right-leaning White British respondents. This is consistent with Indians holding hierarchical attitudes that regard other minorities as lacking the integration that might generate the economic success Indians enjoy, and points to attitudes between minorities as a direction for future research.

2 Dimensions of Heterogeneity

Given the correlates of attitudes towards minorities shown in Table OA2, we describe findings for White British respondents on the heterogeneous impacts of the narratives along three pre-specified dimensions: political leaning, gender and education. Political leaning is the dimension along which perceptions of minorities differ most among controls, and we consider it first.

2.1 Political Leaning

We examine heterogeneous responses to the narratives by self-reported political leaning: left-leaning, centrist or right-leaning. For each outcome, Tables OC1 to OC11 report the control group mean for each political leaning (Column 1) and the treatment effect of each narrative for each political leaning (Columns 2 and 3). We also report p-values on the equality of control means and of treatment effects across political leanings, and on the equality of the effects of the two narratives within each political leaning. The treatment arms are well balanced on political leaning (Table A3 in the main text). We find: (i) the political gradient in perceptions of minorities is first order (and far larger than gradients by gender or education); (ii) the narrative of success shifts perceptions of the economic outcomes of minorities across all political leanings, with the largest response among right-leaning respondents; (iii) treatment effects on perceptions of the ingroup that are consistent with zero-sum thinking are not confined to any one political leaning; (iv) the narrative of success increases support for teaching children about British values among centrist and right-leaning respondents.

Minorities as a Whole Table OC1 shows the stark cleavages in views towards minorities as a whole. Among controls, 88% of left-leaning respondents think ethnic diversity has a positive impact on life in the UK, compared to 44% of centrists and 10% of right-leaning respondents; 92%, 60% and 31% respectively view racial discrimination as a big/moderate problem. Attitudes to immigration also vary in a consistent direction with 30%, 71% and 94%, respectively thinking immigration should be reduced, while 79%, 46% and 18%, respectively consider that the government should reduce economic differences between majority and minorities.

The impacts of the narrative of disadvantage on these views noted in Table OA2 are concentrated among centrists: among them, the narrative of disadvantage increases the share viewing

discrimination as a big/moderate problem by 7.6pp, and the share agreeing that government should aim to reduce economic differences between White British and minority families by 7.7pp.

These differences in views extend to the perception of who is in fact a minority: Table OC2 shows that right-leaning respondents are more than twice as likely as left-leaning respondents to consider the White British to be an ethnic minority (31% vs. 12%), and both narratives increase the share of centrists who consider Indians and Pakistanis to be ethnic minorities (by 9 to 12pp).

Societal Contribution Table OC3 shows a strong gradient in the perceived societal contribution of outgroups by political leaning. While the ranking of groups across the political positions is generally consistent, among controls, right-leaning respondents rate the contribution of Pakistanis (3.3) and Black Caribbeans (4.3) below the midpoint of the 0-10 scale, while left-leaning respondents rate both above 6.9. For any given outgroup, right-leaning respondents perceive a lower contribution to UK society than left-leaning and centrist respondents. The opposite is the case for the ingroup: right-leaning respondents rate the contribution of the White British at 7.9, compared to 6.8 among left-leaning respondents. The narratives nudge some perceptions of outgroups – the narrative of success raises centrists' rating of all minority outgroups, while perceptions of the ingroup are unaffected.

Economic Outcomes Column 1 of Table OC4 shows that, relative to left-leaning respondents, centrist and right-leaning respondents perceive lower graduate shares among men of all minority groups. The gap is largest for Pakistani men: left-leaning respondents perceive a graduate share of 32%, centrists 25%, and right-leaning respondents 17%, with perceived shares being significantly lower among right-leaning than centrist respondents for Pakistani and Black Caribbean men ($p =$ .000 and .002 respectively). In contrast, perceived graduate shares of the ingroup do not differ significantly by political leaning, consistent with more accurate ingroup perceptions. The narrative of success shifts up perceived graduate shares of Indian and Pakistani men – the named groups in the narrative – across political leanings. Right-leaning respondents raise their perception of the graduate share of Pakistani men by 8.4pp, double the impact on left-leaning and centrist respondents (4.2pp each), so closing around a third of the left-right gap among controls. The narrative of disadvantage has far weaker impacts, and perceptions of the ingroup barely shift in response to either narrative. For Pakistanis – the group named in both narratives – the responses to the two narratives differ significantly among left-leaning, centrist and right-leaning respondents ($p = .004$, .001 and .051 respectively).

On perceived employment rates, Table OC5 shows that political leaning again shapes perceptions of all minorities and of the ingroup: left-leaning respondents perceive higher employment rates throughout (for example, 86% for Pakistani men, compared to 77% among centrists and 69% among right-leaning respondents). Perceived employment rates are less sensitive to the narrative of success (which does not refer to employment) than perceived graduate shares, but centrists respond

differentially to the two narratives, with regard to employment rates among Indian ($p = .003$), as well as Pakistani ($p = .001$) and Black Caribbean men ($p = .048$), the two groups mentioned in the narrative of disadvantage.

Opportunities Table OC6 shows weaker gradients by political leaning in perceptions of the opportunities available to minorities than in perceptions of their economic outcomes. The main exception is earning a decent wage: 23% of left-leaning respondents view Indians as having few or no opportunities to do so, compared to 11% of right-leaning respondents ($p = .007$). Perceptions of the opportunities of minorities are rarely shifted by either narrative, for respondents of any political leaning, despite the narratives shifting perceptions of the economic outcomes of minorities.

Turning to the ingroup, the effects of the narrative of success on the perceived lack of opportunities for White British individuals to find work or earn a decent wage are positive for respondents of every political leaning, and largest among right-leaning respondents (6.0pp and 8.5pp), although individually imprecise. On these margins, zero-sum responses appear not to be confined to any specific political leaning. The effect of the narrative of disadvantage in reducing the perceived lack of opportunities for White British individuals to get a good education is driven mostly by centrists: among them, the narrative reduces this perception by 3.6pp, a 55% fall relative to centrists in the control group, and this effect differs significantly from that among left-leaning respondents ($p = .043$).

Causes Table OC7 shows that views on luck versus effort as causes of disadvantage differ starkly by political leaning, with this gradient being more pronounced than on other views. Among controls, relative to left-leaning respondents, centrist and right-leaning respondents are significantly less likely to attribute a lack of success to bad luck, and more likely to attribute it to a lack of effort. This is true for views towards each outgroup: 5% of left-leaning respondents believe a lack of success among Pakistanis is due to a lack of effort, while 44% of right-leaning respondents hold this view; 36% of left-leaning respondents believe a lack of success among Black Caribbeans is due to bad luck, while 7% of right-leaning respondents do so. The gradient also exists in views towards the ingroup on effort (22% versus 46%), but not on bad luck. The narrative of success shifts some of these perceptions, especially with regard to bad luck and towards the groups it names: it increases the view among centrists that a lack of success among Indians and Pakistanis is due to bad luck, and among right-leaning respondents it does so for Pakistanis. The narrative of disadvantage does not shift perceived causes for any group.

There are also large differences by political leaning in perceptions of the labor market discrimination faced by men from each group (Table OC8, where a rank of 1 means the group is perceived to be least likely to be turned down for a job). Centrist and right-leaning respondents perceive each minority to face less discrimination than left-leaning respondents. The narratives do little to shift views towards outgroups, though the narrative of success does reduce left-leaning perceptions

of the discrimination faced by Indian men (by .26 ranks).

Among controls, the opposite gradient holds for the ingroup, and the gradient is strong: left-leaning respondents rank White British men at 1.46, centrists at 1.99 ($p = .000$), and right-leaning respondents at 2.69 (differing from centrists, $p = .008$). The main text documents that the narrative of success increases the perception that White British men face labor market discrimination, in line with zero-sum thinking. The split by political leaning shows that this is partly driven by centrist (.25 ranks) and right-leaning respondents (.40 ranks), with only the former effect being precisely estimated.

Figure OC1 shows perceptions of discrimination across domains by political leaning. In each domain, the share of left-leaning respondents who think a given minority is often discriminated against is several times that among right-leaning respondents, and the pattern is reversed for discrimination faced by the White British ingroup.

Policy Table OC9 shows marked differences by political leaning in views of equal opportunities policies: 3% of left-leaning respondents believe such policies have gone too far for Black Caribbeans, rising to 21% among centrists ($p = .000$) and 49% among right-leaning respondents (differing from centrists, $p = .000$). In contrast, a far greater share of respondents of every political leaning view these policies as not having gone far enough for the ingroup, rather than having gone too far, with right-leaning respondents most likely to hold this view (46%, compared to 21% among left-leaning respondents). The narratives generally do not shift views of equal opportunities policies targeted to minorities, but both narratives slightly increase the share of centrists who view such policies as having gone too far for the ingroup (by 2.5pp and 2.7pp, from a base of 2%).

On the efficacy of non-targeted policies in reducing ethnic inequalities, Table OC10 shows a strong gradient in support by political leaning, as expected given these policies were chosen to appeal to different orientations. Centrist and right-leaning respondents are less supportive of all policies except teaching children about British values, which is supported by 71% of right-leaning respondents but only 23% of left-leaning respondents. This is also the policy for which the narratives most clearly shift support: the narrative of success increases support among centrists by 6.6pp (a 12% increase over centrists in the control group), and among right-leaning respondents by 14.1pp (a 20% increase), with the latter differing significantly from the effect of the narrative of disadvantage ($p = .019$). In light of the evidence that the narrative of success raises concerns consistent with zero-sum thinking, this suggests that the need for minorities to culturally integrate is felt more acutely by centrist and right-leaning respondents when faced with the economic success of minority groups.

Finally, Table OC11 shows that views on immigration are sharply divided by political leaning: among controls, 24% of left-leaning respondents think the number of immigrants from Pakistan should be reduced, compared to 66% of centrists and 86% of right-leaning respondents. The differential responses to the two narratives on immigration documented earlier in Table OA10

are concentrated among centrists, among whom the narrative of disadvantage reduces support for reducing immigration from India, Nigeria, China and Zimbabwe by 6pp to 7pp. Among centrists, the effects of the two narratives differ significantly for immigration from India ($p = .043$), China ($p = .000$) and Zimbabwe ($p = .028$).

2.2 Gender

We find little evidence of heterogeneous responses to the narratives by gender for: (i) attitudes to minorities and whether groups are considered to be minorities (Tables OD1 and OD2); (ii) perceptions of group contributions to society (Table OD3); (iii) opportunities across groups (Table OD4); (iv) whether bad luck or a lack of effort determine the economic success of groups (Table OD5); (vi) discrimination faced by men across groups at the point of recruitment in labor markets (Table OD6); (v) the extent to which equal opportunities policies have gone too far or not far enough across groups (Table OD7).

On other margins we find more substantive evidence of differential responses to narratives by gender. Specifically, women respond significantly more to the narratives in terms of their perceived graduate shares of Indian, Pakistani and Black Caribbean men (Table OD8), but this does not apply to perceived employment shares (Table OD9).

On policy views, Table OD10 shows men and women have relatively similar views over each non-targeted policy in the control group (Columns 1 and 4), but women become significantly more in favor of investing in education/training in response to exposure to either narrative, with the differential magnitudes of response by gender being economically important. We do not see robust differential treatment effects to other policies by gender. We also find some differential responses to narratives by gender on views over immigration – Table OD11 shows womens' views on immigration from different origin countries are, for example, generally less malleable than those of men. For example, men become less supportive of immigration from Pakistan and China in response to the narrative of success.

2.3 Education

We consider heterogeneous responses among White British respondents to the narratives between those with and without a university degree. We find little evidence of heterogeneous responses to narratives for: (i) general attitudes to minorities and whether groups are considered to be minorities (Tables OE1 and OE2); (ii) opportunities for different groups (Table OE3); (iii) perceptions of whether bad luck or a lack of effort determine the economic success of groups (Table OE4); (iv) labor market discrimination faced by men across groups (Tables OE5); (iv) the extent to which equal opportunities policies have gone too far or not far enough across groups (Table OE6).

Where we find slightly more evidence of heterogeneous responses to the narratives by educa-

tion for perceived: (i) contributions of outgroups – specifically, in response to the narrative of success, more educated respondents increase their rankings of the positive contribution of Indians and Pakistanis, the two groups mentioned in that narrative (Table OE7); (ii) graduate shares, where White British respondents revise upward their belief on graduate shares of both the White British ingroup, and Pakistani and Black Caribbean outgroups (Table OE8); (iii) there is no such differential response to perceptions on employment shares (Table OE9).

Education plays a role for responses to narratives in terms of non-targeted policies to reduce ethnic inequalities. As Table OE10 shows, more and less educated individuals differ over their support across the four policies (Columns 1 and 4): more educated individuals are more in favor of investing in education/training and financially supporting families with children, and are less in favor of teaching children about British values (with the groups not differing in terms of increasing penalties for discriminatory behavior). In response to the narrative of success, educated individuals become significantly more in favor of increasing penalties for discriminating against groups. We do not see robust differential treatment effects to other policies by respondent's education.

Finally, while attitudes to immigration differ substantially by educational level, there is no evidence of differential effect of the narratives by education for immigration when considered for specific origin country groups (Table OE11).

3 Other Groups

While our main analysis has focused on the outgroups specified in at least one of the two narratives, we also asked about other groups, to identify if there are similarities or differences in perceptions of specific ethnic groups, whether there are commonalities across 'racial' groups (South Asian, Black and White) as well as whether there are spillover effects from the narratives to perceptions of other non-named minority groups. When asking about which groups were considered to be an ethnic minority, as well as Indian, Pakistani Black Caribbean and White British, we also asked about Bangladeshi, Black African Irish and Polish. For questions on economic outcomes, discrimination, opportunities, and policies, we asked about Polish and Black African men and women, as well as Indian, Pakistani, Black Caribbean and White British men and women.

Who is a Minority and Societal Contribution As Table OF1 shows, the Irish are the group least perceived to be a minority by White British respondents, even lower than for the White British ingroup, while the probability the Polish are seen as ethnic minorities is higher, though lower than for the Black and South Asian groups. Both narratives have the effect of increasing the likelihood of all minority groups being considered as ethnic minorities, including (for the narrative of disadvantage) the Irish. The perceived contribution to society of the Polish is ranked higher than that of Black Africans, and neither narrative has an effect on these estimates (Table OF2).

Economic Outcomes Rates of graduates are underestimated by White British respondents for both Polish and Black Africans, but particularly for Black Africans, who actually have one of the highest rates of degree-holding (Figure OF1). As Table OF3 shows, exposure to the narrative of success increases estimates for Black Africans, slightly closing the gap to the QLFS-benchmark. Panel B of Figure OF1shows that employment rates are under-estimated for men and women of both groups. The narrative of disadvantage reduces the estimate for Black African men only (Table OF4).

Opportunities Black Africans are more likely that Poles to be seen as lacking opportunities for education, work and decent earnings, and neither narrative impacts these estimates (Table OF5).

Causes Table OF6 shows that bad luck is seen by White British respondents as a greater cause of the lack of success for Poles (27%), with lack of effort only regarded as more important by 11%. For Black Africans, bad luck (17%) and lack of effort (21%) are more evenly matched as root causes, and more comparable to the pattern for Black Caribbeans. Neither narrative shifts these perceptions of the relative roles of luck and effort. On discrimination, Black African men and women are regarded as more likely to face discrimination (Table OF7), with Black African men again being ranked very similarly to Black Caribbean men. However, Poles are ranked as much more at risk of discrimination than the White British ingroup. Table OF7 shows that narratives do not shift these perceived ranks, though for Black African men, there is a combined effect of the narrative of success lowering their perceived discrimination risks and the narrative of disadvantage increasing it ($p = 0.05$).

Policies Table OF8 shows 24% of White British control respondents consider equal opportunities policies not to have gone far enough for Black Africans, though a similar share (21%) consider them to have gone too far, a pattern comparable to that for Black Caribbeans. For Poles the respective numbers were 17% and 10%, placing them between Black Africans and White British on both. The narrative of disadvantage, increases the perception that equal opportunities policies had not gone far enough for Caribbeans by 5pp, while the narrative of success increases the perception that they have gone too far for Poles by 3pp, indicating some spill-over effects across minority groups in regarding equal opportunities policies as ways of redressing revealed disadvantage.

References

[1] HAINMUELLER.J AND D.J.HOPKINS (2015) "The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes toward Immigrants," *American Journal of Political Science* 59: 529-48.

Part OA: Additional results on the White British sample

Table OA1: Perceived Minority Share

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Out of every 100 people living in the UK, how many do you think belong to an ethnic minority?				
Ethnic Minority Population Share	.337	.015	.018*	[.793]
	(.007)	(.010)	(.011)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The dependent variable is the respondent's answer to: Out of every 100 people living in the UK, how many do you think belong to an ethnic minority?

Table OA2: Majority Attitudes Towards Minorities, Control Group

Regression estimates, robust standard errors, p-values in brackets

	Ethnic Diversity				Causes		Policies	
	Think inequalities between ethnic groups are a big or moderate problem?		Think ethnic diversity generally has a positive impact on life		Believe that racial discrimination is a big or moderate problem		Agree that government should aim to reduce the economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families?	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age	.000	.002	-.004***	-.001	-.000	.002*	-.004***	-.002*
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Female	.104***	.108***	.024	.024	.098***	.081**	.074**	.060*
	(.033)	(.034)	(.032)	(.030)	(.034)	(.034)	(.033)	(.034)
Undergraduate or higher	.119***	.072*	.223***	.148***	.098***	.047	.151***	.107***
	(.037)	(.037)	(.037)	(.035)	(.037)	(.036)	(.037)	(.037)
Gross HH Income £25K-£50K	-.048	-.055	.083*	.065	.019	.008	.034	.022
	(.050)	(.049)	(.049)	(.044)	(.052)	(.050)	(.051)	(.049)
Gross HH Income >£50K	-.022	-.036	.129**	.106**	-.013	-.023	.028	.018
	(.057)	(.055)	(.058)	(.051)	(.060)	(.054)	(.059)	(.056)
Political Leaning - Centre		-.244***		-.360***		-.325***		-.258***
		(.041)		(.037)		(.036)		(.044)
Political Leaning - Right		-.364***		-.680***		-.611***		-.527***
		(.068)		(.045)		(.056)		(.060)
Centre = Right		.048		.000		.000		.000
Mean outcome	.618	.618	.447	.447	.632	.632	.487	.487
Other control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Test of covariates		[.000]		[.000]		[.000]		[.000]
Observations	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results for respondents in the Control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The dependent variable in Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'a big problem' or 'a moderate problem'. In Columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'very positive' or 'fairly positive'. The dependent variable in Columns 7 and 8 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'strongly agree' or 'agree'. Other control variables include a dummy for being married/in a civil partnership, a dummy for residing in an urban area, and a dummy for home ownership. The omitted category for Political Leaning is respondents that report as left-leaning. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'. Centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'. Right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. At the foot of Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8, the test of covariates reports the p-value on a Wald test of the equivalence of reported coefficients between the specifications with and without controlling for the political leaning of respondents.

Table OA3: Robustness of Majority Attitudes Towards Minorities, Control Group

Regression estimates, robust standard errors, p-values in brackets

	Ethnic Diversity				Causes		Policies	
	To what extent, if at all, do you think inequalities between ethnic groups are a problem?		Think ethnic diversity generally has a positive impact on life		Believe that racial discrimination is a big or moderate problem		Agree that government should aim to reduce economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families?	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age	.001	.001	-.003**	-.002**	.002	.001	-.003**	-.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Female	.097***	.091***	.010	.003	.083**	.067**	.061*	.054*
	(.033)	(.033)	(.031)	(.030)	(.032)	(.032)	(.032)	(.031)
UK born	.007	-.018	-.183**	-.228***	-.014	-.064	-.101	-.138
	(.085)	(.089)	(.071)	(.075)	(.074)	(.078)	(.081)	(.085)
Undergraduate or higher	.081**	.100***	.145***	.168***	.033	.057	.068*	.097***
	(.038)	(.037)	(.037)	(.035)	(.036)	(.035)	(.036)	(.035)
Gross HH Income £25K-£50K	-.055	-.051	.071	.058	.010	.013	.028	.024
	(.050)	(.050)	(.048)	(.046)	(.051)	(.049)	(.049)	(.046)
Gross HH Income >£50K	-.023	-.027	.129**	.104*	-.012	-.024	.034	.014
	(.056)	(.056)	(.056)	(.054)	(.057)	(.056)	(.056)	(.054)
2019 General Election: Conservative	-.197***		-.345***		-.368***		-.364***	
	(.045)		(.044)		(.043)		(.045)	
2019 General Election: Liberal Democrat	-.004		-.071		-.105*		-.031	
	(.062)		(.066)		(.064)		(.065)	
2019 General Election: Brexit Party	-.213*		-.383***		-.502***		-.211*	
	(.127)		(.112)		(.112)		(.127)	
2024 General Election: Conservative		-.125**		-.245***		-.285***		-.492***
		(.058)		(.053)		(.058)		(.046)
2024 General Election: Liberal Democrat		.032		.096*		.040		-.037
		(.059)		(.057)		(.053)		(.064)
2024 General Election: Reform		-.166***		-.437***		-.381***		-.400***
		(.054)		(.044)		(.052)		(.050)
Voted Brexit = Voted Conservative	[.903]		[.726]		[.229]		[.220]	
Voted Reform = Voted Conservative		[.528]		[.000]		[.127]		[.068]
Mean outcome	.618	.618	.447	.447	.632	.632	.487	.487
Other control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Test of covariates		[.466]		[.391]		[.149]		[.323]
Observations	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results for respondents in the Control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The dependent variable in Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'a big problem' or 'a moderate problem'. In Columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'very positive' or 'fairly positive'. The dependent variable in Columns 7 and 8 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'strongly agree' or 'agree'. Other control variables include a dummy for being married/in a civil partnership, a dummy for residing in an urban area, and a dummy for home ownership. The coefficients for categories that includes respondents with missing voting information and respondents that voted some other party are not displayed in the table but were included in the regression. At the foot of Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 we report the p-value on a test of the equality of having voted for the Brexit Party and voted for the Conservative Party in the 2019 General Election. At the foot of Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 we report the p-value on a test of the equality of intending to vote for the Reform Party and intending to vote for the Conservative Party in the 2024 General Election.

Table OA4: Attitudes Towards Minorities

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Do you think ethnic diversity generally has a positive or negative impact on life in the UK?				
Positive	.447	.006	.023	[.492]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Neither positive nor negative	.214	-.012	-.019	[.722]
	(.014)	(.019)	(.020)	
Negative	.282	.021	.010	[.611]
	(.016)	(.022)	(.023)	
Do you believe that racial discrimination in the UK is...				
Big or moderate problem	.632	-.006	.051**	[.014]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Small or no problem	.329	.009	-.041*	[.028]
	(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
Do you think the number of immigrants coming to the UK nowadays should be…				
Reduced	.682	.020	-.025	[.043]
	(.016)	(.022)	(.023)	
Remain the same	.137	.016	.023	[.706]
	(.011)	(.016)	(.017)	
Increased	.096	-.022*	-.002	[.137]
	(.010)	(.013)	(.015)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Positive combines ‘very positive’ and ‘fairly positive’, negative combines ‘fairly negative’ and ‘very negative’; big or moderate problem combines ‘a big problem’ and ‘a moderate problem’, small or no problem combines ‘a small problem’ and ‘not a problem at all’; reduced combines ‘reduced a lot’ and ‘reduced a little’, increased combines ‘increased a little’ and ‘increased a lot’. Respondents could also answer ‘don't know’.

Table OA5: Contribution to Society

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Do you think the following groups generally make a positive or negative contribution to the UK? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 means 'very positive'.				
Indian	6.13	-.050	.018	[.606]
	(.089)	(.128)	(.130)	
Pakistani	5.13	.078	.123	[.750]
	(.100)	(.141)	(.143)	
Black Caribbean	5.59	.068	.095	[.840]
	(.095)	(.132)	(.138)	
White British	7.33	-.119	-.186*	[.518]
	(.072)	(.100)	(.105)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Respondents answered on a scale where 0 means ‘very negative’ and 10 ‘very positive’; ‘not sure’ responses are excluded.

Table OA6: Actual and Perceived Income Ranks

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) QLFS	(2) Control Mean	[1 = 2]	(3) ΔNarrative of Success	(4) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[3 = 4]
In the UK today, which of the following groups of men/women do you think earns the most on average? Drag and drop items to rank from earns most to earns least.						
Men						
Indian	1.00	2.52	[.000]	-.051	.082	[.032]
		(.045)		(.063)	(.062)	
Pakistani	3.00	3.73	[.000]	-.111	.107	[.002]
		(.049)		(.071)	(.069)	
Black Caribbean	6.00	4.61	[.000]	.003	.019	[.800]
		(.047)		(.063)	(.064)	
White British	2.00	1.64	[.000]	.121**	-.136***	[.000]
		(.039)		(.057)	(.050)	
Polish	5.00	3.51	[.000]	.170**	-.039	[.003]
		(.051)		(.070)	(.072)	
Black African	4.00	4.45	[.000]	-.005	.056	[.353]
		(.047)		(.065)	(.067)	
Women						
Indian	1.00	3.00	[.000]	.059	.121*	[.408]
		(.048)		(.072)	(.072)	
Pakistani	6.00	4.24	[.000]	-.109	.195***	[.000]
		(.053)		(.074)	(.074)	
Black Caribbean	2.00	4.56	[.000]	-.033	-.007	[.669]
		(.046)		(.063)	(.064)	
White British	3.00	1.78	[.000]	.075	-.114*	[.002]
		(.044)		(.063)	(.059)	
Polish	4.00	3.50	[.000]	.082	-.070	[.034]
		(.053)		(.073)	(.073)	
Black African	5.00	4.38	[.000]	-.062	.043	[.104]
		(.048)		(.065)	(.067)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Respondents ranked six groups of men (women) from 1 (earns the most) to 6 (earns the least); the outcome is the rank assigned to each group, so a smaller number indicates a higher perceived income. Respondents could assign the same rank to multiple groups, and answer 'not sure'. Column 1 reports the ranks constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table OA7a: Discrimination Across Domains

How frequently do you think that people from the following groups experience discrimination or harassment in … because of their ethnicity?

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

		(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
		Never				Often			
At work	Indian	.056	.008	.010	[.924]	.219	.020	.086***	[.032]
		(.010)	(.016)	(.018)		(.021)	(.029)	(.031)	
	Pakistani	.054	.007	.004	[.899]	.270	.023	.075**	[.102]
		(.010)	(.016)	(.018)		(.022)	(.030)	(.032)	
	Black Caribbean	.050	.020	.014	[.757]	.258	.029	.078**	[.121]
		(.010)	(.017)	(.018)		(.021)	(.030)	(.032)	
	White British	.344	-.028	.018	[.157]	.068	-.007	.021	[.173]
		(.023)	(.032)	(.033)		(.012)	(.016)	(.020)	
By the police	Indian	.141	.003	-.013	[.501]	.125	-.000	.039	[.096]
		(.017)	(.025)	(.024)		(.016)	(.022)	(.024)	
	Pakistani	.114	.004	.013	[.681]	.190	.020	.036	[.568]
		(.016)	(.022)	(.023)		(.019)	(.027)	(.028)	
	Black Caribbean	.076	-.008	-.011	[.859]	.400	-.003	.007	[.778]
		(.013)	(.017)	(.018)		(.024)	(.034)	(.034)	
	White British	.344	-.031	-.030	[.975]	.068	.015	.022	[.716]
		(.023)	(.032)	(.032)		(.013)	(.019)	(.019)	
In getting housing	Indian	.145	.025	-.010	[.178]	.200	-.017	-.020	[.929]
		(.017)	(.025)	(.025)		(.019)	(.026)	(.026)	
	Pakistani	.165	.018	-.022	[.132]	.217	-.018	.004	[.412]
		(.018)	(.026)	(.026)		(.020)	(.027)	(.028)	
	Black Caribbean	.152	.030	-.024	[.033]	.214	-.012	-.005	[.791]
		(.018)	(.026)	(.025)		(.019)	(.027)	(.027)	
	White British	.259	.026	.059*	[.292]	.173	.019	.008	[.693]
		(.021)	(.030)	(.031)		(.018)	(.027)	(.028)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. In the often outcome we combine respondents that answered 'very often' and 'often'. Respondents could also answer 'sometimes' and 'don't know'. Each respondent was asked about three of the six domains.

Table OA7b: Discrimination Across Domains, Continued

How frequently do you think that people from the following groups experience discrimination or harassment in … because of their ethnicity?

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

		(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
		Never				Often			
In getting medical care	Indian	.255	.018	-.027	[.139]	.181	-.040	-.006	[.173]
		(.021)	(.031)	(.030)		(.020)	(.026)	(.027)	
	Pakistani	.244	.032	-.028	[.047]	.225	-.065**	-.024	[.115]
		(.021)	(.030)	(.029)		(.021)	(.028)	(.029)	
	Black Caribbean	.237	.023	-.026	[.103]	.235	-.049*	-.020	[.272]
		(.021)	(.030)	(.029)		(.021)	(.028)	(.029)	
	White British	.460	.005	-.082**	[.010]	.065	.003	.021	[.308]
		(.024)	(.034)	(.034)		(.012)	(.016)	(.018)	
At school	Indian	.038	.002	-.003	[.715]	.375	-.016	.051	[.042]
		(.009)	(.013)	(.014)		(.023)	(.032)	(.034)	
	Pakistani	.045	-.005	-.010	[.749]	.420	-.030	.064*	[.005]
		(.010)	(.015)	(.015)		(.024)	(.033)	(.034)	
	Black Caribbean	.044	.007	-.010	[.305]	.392	-.044	.046	[.006]
		(.010)	(.016)	(.015)		(.023)	(.032)	(.034)	
	White British	.289	-.003	.040	[.178]	.112	-.023	-.013	[.621]
		(.022)	(.031)	(.032)		(.015)	(.020)	(.023)	
On the street or in a public setting	Indian	.040	.017	-.011	[.028]	.298	-.019	-.027	[.773]
		(.011)	(.015)	(.013)		(.022)	(.031)	(.031)	
	Pakistani	.038	.020	-.008	[.029]	.373	-.053*	-.008	[.167]
		(.010)	(.015)	(.013)		(.023)	(.032)	(.033)	
	Black Caribbean	.030	.026*	.009	[.212]	.364	-.030	-.030	[.992]
		(.008)	(.013)	(.012)		(.023)	(.033)	(.033)	
	White British	.302	.041	.007	[.290]	.061	.020	.027	[.728]
		(.021)	(.031)	(.031)		(.011)	(.018)	(.018)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. In the often outcome we combine respondents that answered 'very often' and 'often'. Respondents could also answer 'sometimes' and 'don't know'. Each respondent was asked about three of the six domains.

Table OA8: Equal Opportunities Policy

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone too far or not gone far enough?								
		Not far enough				**Gone too far**		
Indian	.179	-.007	.037*	[.017]	.176	.030	-.006	[.069]
	(.012)	(.017)	(.019)		(.013)	(.019)	(.019)	
Pakistani	.202	-.007	.036*	[.023]	.210	.027	-.009	[.075]
	(.013)	(.018)	(.020)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
Black Caribbean	.236	.022	.045**	[.267]	.200	.018	-.015	[.099]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.021)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
White British	.238	.005	.002	[.897]	.037	.020*	.023**	[.795]
	(.015)	(.021)	(.021)		(.006)	(.010)	(.010)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Respondents could also answer the question with 'about right' or 'don't know'.

Table OA9: Non-targeted Policies

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
How much difference do you think the government could make in reducing inequalities between ethnic groups from the following actions?								
		Great deal/fair amount				**Not much/none**		
Investing more in education and training	.703	.021	.014	[.757]	.186	.010	-.002	[.544]
	(.016)	(.022)	(.023)		(.013)	(.020)	(.019)	
Teaching children more about British values	.515	.071***	.022	[.042]	.362	-.027	-.030	[.903]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
Supporting families with children more financially	.495	.011	.046*	[.155]	.360	.004	-.037	[.076]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
Increasing penalties for discriminating against groups	.475	-.013	.014	[.260]	.386	.039	-.003	[.084]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The great deal/fair amount outcome combines 'a great deal of difference' and 'a fair amount of difference'; not much/none combines 'not much difference' and 'no difference at all'. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Table OA10: Immigration by Country of Origin

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
The top five countries of origin of recent UK immigrants are India, Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. For each of these countries, do you think the number coming to the UK should be…								
		Reduced				**Increased**		
India	.556	.014	-.021	[.136]	.056	-.016	.003	[.055]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.008)	(.010)	(.011)	
Pakistan	.601	.024	-.023	[.048]	.056	-.017*	-.002	[.125]
	(.017)	(.023)	(.024)		(.008)	(.010)	(.011)	
Nigeria	.612	.007	-.039	[.054]	.057	-.010	-.005	[.578]
	(.017)	(.023)	(.024)		(.008)	(.011)	(.011)	
China	.585	.035	-.033	[.004]	.063	-.020*	.006	[.016]
	(.017)	(.023)	(.024)		(.008)	(.011)	(.012)	
Zimbabwe	.576	.021	-.027	[.046]	.062	-.014	-.003	[.318]
	(.017)	(.023)	(.024)		(.008)	(.011)	(.011)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. In the reduced outcome we combine respondents that answered ‘reduced a lot’ or ‘reduced a little’. In the increased outcome we combine respondents that answered ‘increased a lot’ or ‘increased a little’. Respondents could also answer ‘remain the same’ or ‘don't know’.

Table OA11: Role of Government

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
Do you generally agree, disagree, or neither agree nor disagree with the following statements:								
		Strongly agree/agree				**Strongly disagree/disagree**		
In the UK, the economic differences between the rich and poor are unfair	.734	-.001	.030	[.153]	.087	-.002	-.010	[.576]
	(.015)	(.022)	(.022)		(.010)	(.014)	(.013)	
The government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well off.	.468	-.001	.028	[.238]	.285	-.007	-.048**	[.052]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.015)	(.022)	(.021)	
In the UK, the government should aim to reduce the economic differences...								
Between rich and poor families?	.685	.011	.036	[.272]	.097	.010	-.010	[.184]
	(.016)	(.023)	(.023)		(.010)	(.015)	(.014)	
Between White British and ethnic minority families?	.487	.011	.052**	[.095]	.167	.001	-.049***	[.005]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)		(.013)	(.019)	(.017)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Strongly agree/agree combines 'strongly agree' and 'agree'; strongly disagree/disagree combines 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree'. Respondents could also answer 'neither agree nor disagree' or 'don't know'.


Table OA12: Policy Priorities

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
Here are several things that the government might spend more on. Please indicate if you would support or oppose increased spending in each of these areas. Please keep in mind that increasing spending in one area would decrease it in others or would mean raising taxes.								
		Support				**Oppose**		
Increasing income support programmes for the poor?	.594	-.025	-.014	[.646]	.162	.024	-.016	[.031]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.013)	(.019)	(.018)	
Spending more money on schools in poor neighbourhoods?	.752	-.004	.016	[.367]	.053	-.011	-.006	[.644]
	(.015)	(.021)	(.022)		(.008)	(.011)	(.012)	
Providing decent housing for those who cannot afford it?	.725	.016	.027	[.617]	.094	-.012	-.042***	[.022]
	(.016)	(.022)	(.022)		(.011)	(.015)	(.014)	
Improving the conditions of the poorest neighbourhoods?	.776	.020	.028	[.696]	.052	-.009	-.019*	[.312]
	(.015)	(.020)	(.021)		(.008)	(.011)	(.011)	
Spending more on defence and national security?	.512	.077***	.024	[.029]	.189	-.022	.001	[.202]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)		(.014)	(.019)	(.020)	
Spending more on infrastructure such as roads and railways?	.744	.043**	.003	[.058]	.063	-.017	-.016	[.932]
	(.015)	(.020)	(.022)		(.010)	(.012)	(.013)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The support outcome combines 'strongly support' and 'tend to support'; oppose combines 'tend to oppose' and 'strongly oppose'. Respondents could also answer 'neither support nor oppose'.

Figure OA1: Perceived Income Ranks



Notes: Each panel reports means for respondents in the Control arm with 95% confidence intervals, and the ranks constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. A higher rank (smaller number) indicates a higher perceived level of income.

Part OB: White British versus Indian respondents

Table OB1: Opportunities, Causes and Policies, White British and Indian Respondents

Means, p-values in brackets

		Respondent: (1) White British	(2) Indian	[1 = 2]
A. Perceptions				
Do you think the following groups generally make a positive or negative contribution to the UK? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 means 'very positive'.				
Group asked about:	*White British*	7.33	6.99	[.293]
	Indian	6.13	8.00	[.000]
Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?				
Group asked about:	*White British*	.360	.453	[.007]
	Indian	.355	.582	[.000]
Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you say are working?				
Group asked about:	*White British*	.724	.728	[.873]
	Indian	.784	.850	[.003]
B. Opportunities				
Do the following groups have few or no opportunities to...where you live?				
Group asked about: White British	*Get a good education*	.066	.056	[.769]
	Get a job	.097	.101	[.938]
	Earn a decent wage	.156	.000	[.000]
Group asked about: Indian	*Get a good education*	.103	.076	[.484]
	Get a job	.139	.148	[.872]
	Earn a decent wage	.200	.128	[.171]
C. Causes				
Does lack of effort or bad luck generally have more to do with whether a person from each of the following groups is unsuccessful?				
Group asked about: White British	*Bad luck*	.074	.091	[.757]
	Lack of Effort	.339	.412	[.358]
Group asked about: Indian	*Bad luck*	.240	.432	[.022]
	Lack of Effort	.128	.117	[.815]
D. Policies				
Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone…				
Group asked about: White British	*Not far enough*	.238	.069	[.000]
	Gone too far	.037	.247	[.002]
Group asked about: Indian	*Not far enough*	.179	.450	[.001]
	Gone too far	.176	.023	[.000]

Notes: The sample is restricted to White British and Indian respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. We report means by respondent ethnicity. The p-values are calculated from an OLS regression of each outcome on a constant and a full set of treatment dummy interactions with ethnic group, with robust standard errors. In Panel B, respondents could answer each question with plenty, some, few or no opportunities, or don't know; we combine few and no opportunities. In Panel C, respondents could answer bad luck, a lack of effort, an equal mix of both or don't know. In Panel D, respondents could also answer 'about right' or 'don't know'.

Table OB2: Non-targeted Policies, White British and Indian Respondents

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
How much difference do you think the government could make in reducing inequalities between ethnic groups from the following actions?								
	Great deal/fair amount				**Not much/none**			
Investing more in education and training								
Indian	.826	-.154	.087	[.013]	.098	.212**	-.038	[.008]
	(.065)	(.110)	(.075)		(.057)	(.105)	(.066)	
White British	.703	.021	.014	[.757]	.186	.010	-.002	[.544]
	(.016)	(.023)	(.023)		(.013)	(.020)	(.019)	
WB=I	*[.064]*	*[.119]*	*[.351]*		*[.131]*	*[.059]*	*[.600]*	
Teaching children more about British values								
Indian	.470	.009	.227**	[.048]	.433	.047	-.175*	[.042]
	(.080)	(.120)	(.102)		(.083)	(.123)	(.102)	
White British	.515	.071***	.022	[.042]	.362	-.027	-.030	[.903]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)		(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
WB=I	*[.580]*	*[.616]*	*[.051]*		*[.401]*	*[.551]*	*[.167]*	
Supporting families with children more financially								
Indian	.768	-.302***	-.136	[.147]	.157	.248**	.113	[.205]
	(.070)	(.114)	(.099)		(.063)	(.107)	(.090)	
White British	.495	.011	.046*	[.155]	.360	.004	-.037	[.076]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)		(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
WB=I	*[.000]*	*[.007]*	*[.073]*		*[.002]*	*[.025]*	*[.107]*	
Increasing penalties for discriminating against groups								
Indian	.605	.053	.160	[.318]	.298	-.041	-.113	[.469]
	(.082)	(.119)	(.103)		(.082)	(.116)	(.100)	
White British	.475	-.013	.014	[.261]	.386	.039	-.003	[.084]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
WB=I	*[.123]*	*[.582]*	*[.171]*		*[.289]*	*[.502]*	*[.282]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British, Indian and Other White respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for ethnic group; the WB=I rows report p-values on tests of equality of the coefficient between White British and Indian respondents. Robust standard errors are reported. The great deal/fair amount outcome combines 'a great deal of difference' and 'a fair amount of difference'; not much/none combines 'not much difference' and 'no difference at all'. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Part OC: Heterogeneity by political leaning

Table OC1: Attitudes Towards Minorities, by Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

		(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Ethnic diversity has a positive impact on life in the UK					
Left Leaning		.878	-.078*	-.026	[.221]
		(.025)	(.040)	(.038)	
Centre Leaning		.440	.045	.036	[.801]
		(.023)	(.033)	(.035)	
	C=L	*[.000]*	*[.019]*	*[.228]*	
Right Leaning		.104	.059	.094*	[.482]
		(.038)	(.050)	(.054)	
	R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.034, .824]*	*[.071, .372]*	
Racial discrimination in the UK is a big or moderate problem					
Left Leaning		.923	-.045	-.036	[.802]
		(.020)	(.034)	(.032)	
Centre Leaning		.603	-.009	.076**	[.011]
		(.024)	(.033)	(.034)	
	C=L	*[.000]*	*[.447]*	*[.016]*	
Right Leaning		.312	.086	.025	[.361]
		(.049)	(.068)	(.068)	
	R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.082, .206]*	*[.419, .504]*	
The number of immigrants coming to the UK should be reduced					
Left Leaning		.296	.001	-.027	[.561]
		(.037)	(.051)	(.051)	
Centre Leaning		.711	.037	-.015	[.097]
		(.021)	(.030)	(.032)	
	C=L	*[.000]*	*[.542]*	*[.841]*	
Right Leaning		.939	.037	-.031	[.046]
		(.035)	-.037	(.047)	
	R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.574, .993]*	*[.955, .780]*	
Government should reduce economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families					
Left Leaning		.791	.038	.032	[.893]
		(.032)	(.043)	(.045)	
Centre Leaning		.462	.009	.077**	[.050]
		(.024)	(.034)	(.035)	
	C=L	*[.000]*	*[.604]*	*[.422]*	
Right Leaning		.177	.081	.084	[.962]
		(.045)	(.062)	(.063)	
	R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.561, .303]*	*[.498, .923]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'; centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'; right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. Respondents who did not report a political leaning are excluded. The rows C=L and R=L, R=C report p-values on tests of equality of the coefficient across political-leaning groups. The dependent variables are dummies equal to one if the respondent answers 'very positive' or 'fairly positive' (ethnic diversity), 'a big problem' or 'a moderate problem' (racial discrimination), 'reduced a lot' or 'reduced a little' (immigration) and 'strongly agree' or 'agree' (government policy), and zero otherwise (including 'don't know').

Table OC2: Which Groups are Minorities, by Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

		(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Which of the following groups do you consider to be ethnic minorities?					
White British					
Left Leaning		.121	-.024	.000	[.478]
		(.026)	(.033)	(.037)	
Centre Leaning		.238	-.031	-.038	[.823]
		(.020)	(.029)	(.029)	
	C=L	*[.000]*	*[.859]*	*[.414]*	
Right Leaning		.308	-.019	-.024	[.932]
		(.051)	(.070)	(.070)	
	R=L, R=C	*[.001, .199]*	*[.949, .866]*	*[.755, .862]*	
Indian					
Left Leaning		.736	.033	.033	[.997]
		(.038)	(.048)	(.049)	
Centre Leaning		.430	.089***	.098***	[.783]
		(.023)	(.033)	(.035)	
	C=L	*[.000]*	*[.342]*	*[.278]*	
Right Leaning		.405	.115	.058	[.433]
		(.056)	(.074)	(.078)	
	R=L, R=C	*[.000, .672]*	*[.352, .745]*	*[.784, .635]*	
Pakistani					
Left Leaning		.747	.046	.048	[.954]
		(.037)	(.047)	(.048)	
Centre Leaning		.437	.110***	.120***	[.769]
		(.024)	(.033)	(.035)	
	C=L	*[.000]*	*[.267]*	*[.225]*	
Right Leaning		.487	.032	-.009	[.574]
		(.057)	(.075)	(.079)	
	R=L, R=C	*[.000, .418]*	*[.879, .344]*	*[.537, .133]*	
Black Caribbean					
Left Leaning		.732	.037	.080*	[.312]
		(.038)	(.048)	(.048)	
Centre Leaning		.476	.048	.087**	[.268]
		(.024)	(.034)	(.035)	
	C=L	*[.000]*	*[.858]*	*[.919]*	
Right Leaning		.473	.035	.036	[.999]
		(.057)	(.075)	(.079)	
	R=L, R=C	*[.000, .963]*	*[.982, .879]*	*[.625, .553]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'; centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'; right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. Respondents who did not report a political leaning are excluded. The rows C=L and R=L, R=C report p-values on tests of equality of the coefficient across political-leaning groups. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent selected the group as an ethnic minority.

Table OC3: Contribution to Society, by Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Do you think the following groups generally make a positive or negative contribution to the UK? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 means 'very positive'.				
Indian				
Left Leaning	7.20	.135	.288	[.501]
	(.151)	(.212)	(.228)	
Centre Leaning	6.08	.287*	.180	[.500]
	(.131)	(.163)	(.183)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.569]*	*[.711]*	
Right Leaning	5.60	-.507	-.853**	[.429]
	(.238)	(.365)	(.414)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .076]*	*[.128, .047]*	*[.016, .023]*	
Pakistani				
Left Leaning	6.91	-.054	.298	[.175]
	(.163)	(.239)	(.252)	
Centre Leaning	4.98	.434**	.187	[.167]
	(.138)	(.178)	(.195)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.102]*	*[.727]*	
Right Leaning	3.29	.091	.101	[.981]
	(.290)	(.399)	(.419)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.755, .434]*	*[.687, .852]*	
Black Caribbean				
Left Leaning	7.18	-.190	.294	[.044]
	(.149)	(.216)	(.236)	
Centre Leaning	5.50	.306*	.178	[.451]
	(.132)	(.168)	(.189)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.071]*	*[.700]*	
Right Leaning	4.32	.149	-.668	[.052]
	(.295)	(.408)	(.429)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.464, .723]*	*[.049, .071]*	
White British				
Left Leaning	6.78	-.201	.057	[.252]
	(.148)	(.213)	(.222)	
Centre Leaning	7.36	-.127	-.155	[.836]
	(.105)	(.135)	(.149)	
C=L	*[.001]*	*[.768]*	*[.428]*	
Right Leaning	7.88	.095	.296	[.479]
	(.235)	(.308)	(.312)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .045]*	*[.429, .510]*	*[.533, .192]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'; centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'; right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. Respondents who did not report a political leaning are excluded. The rows C=L and R=L, R=C report p-values on tests of equality of the coefficient across political-leaning groups. Respondents answered on a scale where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 'very positive'; 'not sure' responses are excluded.

Table OC4: Perceived Graduate Shares, by Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?				
Indian				
Left Leaning	.397	.049**	-.010	[.022]
	(.017)	(.025)	(.024)	
Centre Leaning	.348	.035**	.020	[.336]
	(.011)	(.015)	(.016)	
C=L	*[.015]*	*[.634]*	*[.306]*	
Right Leaning	.335	.050	-.010	[.093]
	(.024)	(.033)	(.037)	
R=L, R=C	*[.036, .618]*	*[.976, .678]*	*[.996, .458]*	
Pakistani				
Left Leaning	.316	.042*	-.026	[.004]
	(.015)	(.023)	(.021)	
Centre Leaning	.245	.042***	-.003	[.001]
	(.010)	(.014)	(.014)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.989]*	*[.382]*	
Right Leaning	.174	.084***	.021	[.051]
	(.017)	(.029)	(.028)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.251, .187]*	*[.192, .451]*	
Black Caribbean				
Left Leaning	.259	.019	-.022	[.027]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.018)	
Centre Leaning	.194	.019*	.013	[.612]
	(.007)	(.011)	(.012)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.988]*	*[.094]*	
Right Leaning	.147	.023	-.004	[.207]
	(.014)	(.021)	(.021)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .002]*	*[.882, .866]*	*[.502, .468]*	
White British				
Left Leaning	.364	-.005	.035*	[.041]
	(.013)	(.019)	(.019)	
Centre Leaning	.355	-.014	-.008	[.648]
	(.009)	(.012)	(.013)	
C=L	*[.588]*	*[.718]*	*[.060]*	
Right Leaning	.326	.001	.013	[.700]
	(.021)	(.028)	(.032)	
R=L, R=C	*[.133, .211]*	*[.849, .629]*	*[.552, .546]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'; centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'; right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. Respondents who did not report a political leaning are excluded. The rows C=L and R=L, R=C report p-values on tests of equality of the coefficient across political-leaning groups. The dependent variable is the respondent's answer, as a share, to: Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?

Table OC5: Perceived Employment Rates, by Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Out of 100 men of working age in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many would you say are working?				
Indian				
Left Leaning	.861	.006	.006	[.988]
	(.010)	(.014)	(.014)	
Centre Leaning	.801	.021	-.017	[.003]
	(.011)	(.013)	(.015)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.437]*	*[.265]*	
Right Leaning	.773	.011	-.027	[.390]
	(.023)	(.031)	(.045)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .278]*	*[.875, .782]*	*[.489, .843]*	
Pakistani				
Left Leaning	.858	.001	-.010	[.437]
	(.010)	(.014)	(.015)	
Centre Leaning	.770	.017	-.031*	[.001]
	(.011)	(.014)	(.016)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.430]*	*[.361]*	
Right Leaning	.693	.032	.006	[.572]
	(.030)	(.038)	(.048)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .016]*	*[.456, .719]*	*[.745, .470]*	
Black Caribbean				
Left Leaning	.844	-.018	-.008	[.491]
	(.010)	(.014)	(.014)	
Centre Leaning	.748	.005	-.024	[.048]
	(.011)	(.014)	(.016)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.251]*	*[.455]*	
Right Leaning	.661	-.010	.010	[.661]
	(.033)	(.042)	(.050)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .012]*	*[.866, .731]*	*[.733, .522]*	
White British				
Left Leaning	.783	-.005	.004	[.573]
	(.012)	(.017)	(.017)	
Centre Leaning	.743	.003	-.003	[.646]
	(.008)	(.012)	(.013)	
C=L	*[.008]*	*[.706]*	*[.724]*	
Right Leaning	.729	.001	-.017	[.682]
	(.021)	(.027)	(.043)	
R=L, R=C	*[.027, .519]*	*[.858, .943]*	*[.657, .772]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'; centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'; right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. Respondents who did not report a political leaning are excluded. The rows C=L and R=L, R=C report p-values on tests of equality of the coefficient across political-leaning groups. The dependent variable is the respondent's answer, as a share, to: Out of 100 men of working age in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many would you say are working?

Table OC6: Opportunities, by Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]	(7) Control Mean	(8) ΔNarrative of Success	(9) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[8 = 9]
Do the following groups have few or no opportunities to...where you live?												
		Get a good education				Get a job				Earn a decent wage		
Indian												
Left Leaning	.100	-.031	.053	[.014]	.134	.046	.027	[.648]	.231	.049	.053	[.933]
	(.025)	(.030)	(.039)		(.027)	(.040)	(.040)		(.033)	(.048)	(.049)	
Centre Leaning	.106	-.034*	.012	[.035]	.128	-.001	-.000	[.970]	.204	.000	-.019	[.481]
	(.014)	(.019)	(.023)		(.016)	(.023)	(.024)		(.019)	(.028)	(.027)	
C=L	*[.843]*	*[.947]*	*[.370]*		*[.831]*	*[.307]*	*[.568]*		*[.473]*	*[.379]*	*[.198]*	
Right Leaning	.066	.017	-.032	[.106]	.067	.014	.037	[.540]	.110	.034	.013	[.642]
	(.025)	(.036)	(.030)		(.024)	(.033)	(.038)		(.031)	(.044)	(.045)	
R=L, R=C	*[.347, .181]*	*[.305, .210]*	*[.085, .250]*		*[.063, .035]*	*[.544, .696]*	*[.850, .406]*		*[.007, .010]*	*[.819, .518]*	*[.546, .546]*	
Pakistani												
Left Leaning	.150	-.042	.053	[.016]	.162	.026	.038	[.798]	.277	.065	.046	[.703]
	(.029)	(.036)	(.044)		(.030)	(.042)	(.043)		(.035)	(.050)	(.051)	
Centre Leaning	.124	-.024	.026	[.037]	.170	-.008	.013	[.445]	.276	-.038	-.039	[.978]
	(.015)	(.020)	(.025)		(.018)	(.025)	(.027)		(.021)	(.030)	(.030)	
C=L	*[.424]*	*[.661]*	*[.586]*		*[.807]*	*[.483]*	*[.625]*		*[.984]*	*[.076]*	*[.151]*	
Right Leaning	.121	-.027	-.051	[.501]	.109	-.027	.023	[.201]	.150	.012	.012	[.990]
	(.035)	(.044)	(.043)		(.034)	(.041)	(.047)		(.037)	(.049)	(.052)	
R=L, R=C	*[.525, .938]*	*[.788, .952]*	*[.087, .120]*		*[.236, .106]*	*[.362, .688]*	*[.818, .847]*		*[.013, .003]*	*[.452, .382]*	*[.639, .398]*	
Black Caribbean												
Left Leaning	.167	-.026	.067	[.024]	.188	.029	.027	[.969]	.312	.087*	.076	[.841]
	(.029)	(.038)	(.044)		(.031)	(.044)	(.045)		(.036)	(.051)	(.053)	
Centre Leaning	.156	-.002	.011	[.623]	.197	-.002	-.023	[.431]	.297	.001	-.047	[.119]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.026)		(.019)	(.027)	(.027)		(.022)	(.031)	(.031)	
C=L	*[.748]*	*[.587]*	*[.273]*		*[.804]*	*[.543]*	*[.334]*		*[.722]*	*[.152]*	*[.043]*	
Right Leaning	.134	-.019	-.059	[.283]	.144	-.013	.005	[.686]	.217	.026	-.033	[.297]
	(.037)	(.047)	(.044)		(.037)	(.047)	(.050)		(.047)	(.063)	(.060)	
R=L, R=C	*[.490, .595]*	*[.897, .749]*	*[.043, .171]*		*[.365, .203]*	*[.509, .837]*	*[.735, .624]*		*[.109, .123]*	*[.453, .720]*	*[.174, .836]*	
White British												
Left Leaning	.035	.000	.023	[.326]	.079	.021	-.017	[.230]	.166	.060	-.028	[.042]
	(.018)	(.022)	(.026)		(.022)	(.033)	(.030)		(.030)	(.044)	(.041)	
Centre Leaning	.065	.006	-.036***	[.006]	.095	.018	-.031*	[.015]	.153	.028	-.037	[.008]
	(.011)	(.017)	(.014)		(.014)	(.021)	(.018)		(.017)	(.025)	(.023)	
C=L	*[.146]*	*[.847]*	*[.043]*		*[.551]*	*[.953]*	*[.707]*		*[.698]*	*[.522]*	*[.852]*	
Right Leaning	.064	-.005	.005	[.839]	.079	.060	.044	[.785]	.133	.085	.043	[.531]
	(.026)	(.034)	(.052)		(.028)	(.045)	(.056)		(.035)	(.054)	(.063)	
R=L, R=C	*[.360, .954]*	*[.897, .779]*	*[.762, .443]*		*[.989, .625]*	*[.482, .401]*	*[.334, .205]*		*[.473, .612]*	*[.728, .340]*	*[.343, .230]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'; centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'; right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. Respondents who did not report a political leaning are excluded. The rows C=L and R=L, R=C report p-values on tests of equality of the coefficient across political-leaning groups. Respondents could answer each question with plenty, some, few or no opportunities, or don't know. We combine few and no opportunities for each outcome.

Table OC7: Luck vs Effort, by Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	Luck vs Effort Control Means [1] = [4]	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Controls	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
Does lack of effort or bad luck generally have more to do with whether a person from each of the following groups is unsuccessful?									
			Bad luck				**Lack of Effort**		
Indian									
Left Leaning	[.000]	.381	-.041	.024	[.211]	.026	.030	.008	[.331]
		(.040)	(.053)	(.055)		(.012)	(.021)	(.018)	
Centre Leaning	[.002]	.223	.056**	.013	[.146]	.144	-.017	-.035	[.432]
		(.019)	(.029)	(.028)		(.018)	(.024)	(.025)	
C=L		*[.000]*	*[.107]*	*[.858]*		*[.000]*	*[.147]*	*[.154]*	
Right Leaning	[.934]	.230	-.047	-.035	[.825]	.224	.033	.056	[.743]
		(.048)	(.059)	(.062)		(.045)	(.063)	(.071)	
R=L, R=C		*[.015, .892]*	*[.940, .116]*	*[.475, .481]*		*[.000, .100]*	*[.962, .463]*	*[.515, .225]*	
Pakistani									
Left Leaning	[.000]	.338	-.021	.064	[.099]	.052	.011	.009	[.922]
		(.039)	(.052)	(.054)		(.016)	(.025)	(.023)	
Centre Leaning	[.060]	.169	.049*	.015	[.221]	.219	-.014	-.029	[.579]
		(.018)	(.026)	(.026)		(.020)	(.028)	(.029)	
C=L		*[.000]*	*[.230]*	*[.420]*		*[.000]*	*[.491]*	*[.299]*	
Right Leaning	[.000]	.055	.074**	.028	[.251]	.441	-.078	.034	[.124]
		(.022)	(.037)	(.034)		(.057)	(.075)	(.078)	
R=L, R=C		*[.000, .000]*	*[.138, .591]*	*[.579, .762]*		*[.000, .000]*	*[.257, .424]*	*[.757, .446]*	
Black Caribbean									
Left Leaning	[.000]	.364	-.078	.023	[.046]	.048	.035	.004	[.245]
		(.040)	(.052)	(.055)		(.017)	(.027)	(.023)	
Centre Leaning	[.000]	.140	.014	.021	[.785]	.236	.003	-.027	[.292]
		(.016)	(.023)	(.025)		(.021)	(.029)	(.029)	
C=L		*[.000]*	*[.105]*	*[.979]*		*[.000]*	*[.427]*	*[.396]*	
Right Leaning	[.000]	.069	.048	.002	[.309]	.454	-.030	.028	[.415]
		(.027)	(.045)	(.038)		(.057)	(.074)	(.078)	
R=L, R=C		*[.000, .023]*	*[.067, .510]*	*[.751, .669]*		*[.000, .000]*	*[.407, .673]*	*[.767, .506]*	
White British									
Left Leaning	[.026]	.128	-.005	.002	[.843]	.223	.075	.064	[.822]
		(.028)	(.037)	(.039)		(.031)	(.046)	(.046)	
Centre Leaning	[.000]	.058	.017	-.011	[.073]	.376	.033	-.030	[.059]
		(.012)	(.017)	(.015)		(.023)	(.033)	(.033)	
C=L		*[.024]*	*[.583]*	*[.752]*		*[.000]*	*[.465]*	*[.098]*	
Right Leaning	[.000]	.093	.019	.012	[.897]	.459	-.037	-.075	[.584]
		(.028)	(.043)	(.055)		(.057)	(.075)	(.076)	
R=L, R=C		*[.385, .256]*	*[.671, .972]*	*[.886, .688]*		*[.000, .178]*	*[.203, .389]*	*[.118, .589]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'; centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'; right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. Respondents who did not report a political leaning are excluded. The rows C=L and R=L, R=C report p-values on tests of equality of the coefficient across political-leaning groups. Respondents could answer the question with bad luck, a lack of effort, an equal mix of both or don't know.

Table OC8: Labor Market Discrimination, by Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Imagine that the following men applied for a job, which they were qualified for. Please rank them based on how likely you think they would be to be turned down for the job.				
Indian				
Left Leaning	3.34	-.260*	-.035	[.118]
	(.102)	(.141)	(.147)	
Centre Leaning	3.05	-.087	.120	[.037]
	(.070)	(.095)	(.104)	
C=L	*[.016]*	*[.309]*	*[.390]*	
Right Leaning	2.68	-.106	.122	[.281]
	(.149)	(.203)	(.219)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .028]*	*[.531, .935]*	*[.552, .992]*	
Pakistani				
Left Leaning	4.15	-.193	-.163	[.843]
	(.108)	(.149)	(.158)	
Centre Leaning	3.80	-.066	.075	[.202]
	(.081)	(.111)	(.114)	
C=L	*[.010]*	*[.493]*	*[.221]*	
Right Leaning	3.51	-.480*	.045	[.050]
	(.221)	(.270)	(.310)	
R=L, R=C	*[.010, .223]*	*[.354, .157]*	*[.550, .927]*	
Black Caribbean				
Left Leaning	4.34	.173	.084	[.596]
	(.121)	(.168)	(.171)	
Centre Leaning	4.06	-.108	.041	[.223]
	(.083)	(.117)	(.122)	
C=L	*[.053]*	*[.169]*	*[.835]*	
Right Leaning	3.67	-.128	-.239	[.702]
	(.250)	(.313)	(.333)	
R=L, R=C	*[.016, .141]*	*[.396, .953]*	*[.388, .431]*	
White British				
Left Leaning	1.46	.006	-.136	[.251]
	(.101)	(.139)	(.127)	
Centre Leaning	1.99	.249**	-.038	[.020]
	(.085)	(.120)	(.125)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.184]*	*[.582]*	
Right Leaning	2.69	.396	.070	[.377]
	(.248)	(.336)	(.382)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .008]*	*[.283, .680]*	*[.609, .788]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'; centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'; right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. Respondents who did not report a political leaning are excluded. The rows C=L and R=L, R=C report p-values on tests of equality of the coefficient across political-leaning groups. Respondents ranked six hypothetical men by how likely they would be to be turned down for a job they were qualified for; the outcome is the rank assigned to each group, recoded so that a higher value indicates a greater likelihood of being turned down. Respondents could assign the same rank to multiple groups, and answer 'not sure'.

Table OC9: Equal Opportunities Policy, by Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone too far or not gone far enough?								
		Not far enough				**Gone too far**		
Indian								
Left Leaning	.440	-.050	.031	[.129]	.033	.030	.027	[.915]
	(.040)	(.054)	(.055)		(.013)	(.022)	(.024)	
Centre Leaning	.155	.003	.009	[.794]	.187	.000	-.032	[.204]
	(.017)	(.023)	(.025)		(.020)	(.027)	(.027)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.365]*	*[.727]*		*[.000]*	*[.399]*	*[.101]*	
Right Leaning	.048	.032	-.016	[.093]	.354	.089	.023	[.373]
	(.022)	(.033)	(.027)		(.053)	(.072)	(.076)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.195, .480]*	*[.445, .477]*		*[.000, .003]*	*[.432, .250]*	*[.967, .492]*	
Pakistani								
Left Leaning	.468	-.001	.055	[.292]	.042	.032	.020	[.686]
	(.040)	(.054)	(.056)		(.014)	(.025)	(.025)	
Centre Leaning	.180	-.001	.025	[.316]	.222	.002	-.034	[.191]
	(.018)	(.025)	(.027)		(.020)	(.028)	(.028)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.999]*	*[.623]*		*[.000]*	*[.422]*	*[.147]*	
Right Leaning	.040	.040	-.003	[.135]	.497	.037	-.019	[.446]
	(.019)	(.031)	(.024)		(.057)	(.075)	(.079)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.507, .294]*	*[.336, .436]*		*[.000, .000]*	*[.952, .663]*	*[.636, .856]*	
Black Caribbean								
Left Leaning	.533	.012	.044	[.558]	.030	.018	.025	[.787]
	(.041)	(.055)	(.056)		(.012)	(.022)	(.024)	
Centre Leaning	.231	.021	.019	[.962]	.214	.009	-.034	[.124]
	(.020)	(.028)	(.029)		(.020)	(.028)	(.028)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.894]*	*[.697]*		*[.000]*	*[.791]*	*[.105]*	
Right Leaning	.052	.092**	.005	[.035]	.485	.000	-.019	[.787]
	(.022)	(.043)	(.030)		(.057)	(.075)	(.079)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.251, .160]*	*[.545, .741]*		*[.000, .000]*	*[.820, .918]*	*[.585, .865]*	
White British								
Left Leaning	.208	-.014	-.044	[.458]	.063	-.011	.052	[.043]
	(.032)	(.044)	(.042)		(.019)	(.025)	(.032)	
Centre Leaning	.240	-.018	-.017	[.949]	.020	.025**	.027**	[.896]
	(.021)	(.029)	(.029)		(.006)	(.011)	(.012)	
C=L	*[.406]*	*[.937]*	*[.590]*		*[.028]*	*[.196]*	*[.467]*	
Right Leaning	.457	-.049	-.042	[.930]	.049	.061	.023	[.392]
	(.057)	(.074)	(.079)		(.025)	(.042)	(.038)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.690, .704]*	*[.984, .759]*		*[.649, .253]*	*[.144, .410]*	*[.561, .925]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'; centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'; right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. Respondents who did not report a political leaning are excluded. The rows C=L and R=L, R=C report p-values on tests of equality of the coefficient across political-leaning groups. Respondents could also answer the question with 'about right' or 'don't know'.

Table OC10: Non-targeted Policies, by Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
How much difference do you think the government could make in reducing inequalities between ethnic groups from the following actions?								
		Great deal/fair amount				**Not much/none**		
Investing more in education and training								
Left Leaning	.915	.007	.020	[.636]	.036	.010	.013	[.919]
	(.022)	(.030)	(.030)		(.014)	(.022)	(.023)	
Centre Leaning	.735	.014	-.017	[.328]	.185	.007	.008	[.968]
	(.022)	(.031)	(.032)		(.019)	(.027)	(.028)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.867]*	*[.390]*		*[.000]*	*[.913]*	*[.886]*	
Right Leaning	.508	.111	.007	[.157]	.366	-.039	.034	[.318]
	(.057)	(.075)	(.079)		(.054)	(.072)	(.077)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.198, .232]*	*[.874, .773]*		*[.000, .001]*	*[.509, .552]*	*[.797, .752]*	
Teaching children more about British values								
Left Leaning	.229	.036	.033	[.947]	.697	-.020	-.040	[.686]
	(.032)	(.046)	(.047)		(.036)	(.050)	(.051)	
Centre Leaning	.568	.066**	.015	[.133]	.328	-.020	-.021	[.958]
	(.024)	(.033)	(.035)		(.022)	(.031)	(.032)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.598]*	*[.757]*		*[.000]*	*[.000]*	*[.757]*	
Right Leaning	.712	.141**	.008	[.019]	.213	-.097*	-.019	[.113]
	(.051)	(.061)	(.069)		(.046)	(.055)	(.061)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .011]*	*[.167, .275]*	*[.766, .930]*		*[.000, .025]*	*[.295, .218]*	*[.793, .976]*	
Supporting families with children more financially								
Left Leaning	.770	.008	.060	[.223]	.134	-.003	-.004	[.989]
	(.033)	(.046)	(.045)		(.027)	(.038)	(.038)	
Centre Leaning	.496	-.022	.040	[.076]	.396	.032	-.048	[.017]
	(.024)	(.034)	(.035)		(.023)	(.033)	(.033)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.601]*	*[.718]*		*[.000]*	*[.485]*	*[.386]*	
Right Leaning	.239	.035	.053	[.767]	.637	.003	-.081	[.238]
	(.053)	(.067)	(.071)		(.056)	(.072)	(.078)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.738, .448]*	*[.936, .862]*		*[.000, .000]*	*[.941, .716]*	*[.377, .698]*	
Increasing penalties for discriminating against groups								
Left Leaning	.686	-.014	-.005	[.856]	.220	.038	.061	[.643]
	(.036)	(.051)	(.052)		(.031)	(.046)	(.047)	
Centre Leaning	.478	-.038	-.001	[.282]	.419	.060*	-.010	[.040]
	(.024)	(.034)	(.035)		(.023)	(.033)	(.034)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.686]*	*[.955]*		*[.000]*	*[.700]*	*[.222]*	
Right Leaning	.182	.116*	.044	[.220]	.727	-.104	-.041	[.336]
	(.044)	(.062)	(.060)		(.050)	(.068)	(.069)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.105, .028]*	*[.542, .520]*		*[.000, .000]*	*[.082, .030]*	*[.223, .691]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'; centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'; right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. Respondents who did not report a political leaning are excluded. The rows C=L and R=L, R=C report p-values on tests of equality of the coefficient across political-leaning groups. The great deal/fair amount outcome combines 'a great deal of difference' and 'a fair amount of difference'; not much/none combines 'not much difference' and 'no difference at all'. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Table OC11: Immigration by Country of Origin, by Political Leaning


Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
The top five countries of origin of recent UK immigrants are India, Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. For each of these countries, do you think the number coming to the UK should be…								
		Reduced				**Increased**		
India								
Left Leaning	.226	.033	-.008	[.373]	.151	-.052	.027	[.030]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.047)		(.028)	(.035)	(.040)	
Centre Leaning	.607	.008	-.061*	[.043]	.038	.004	.007	[.883]
	(.023)	(.032)	(.034)		(.009)	(.014)	(.014)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.660]*	*[.368]*		*[.000]*	*[.136]*	*[.635]*	
Right Leaning	.708	.036	.095	[.314]	.058	-.045	-.047	[.889]
	(.059)	(.072)	(.071)		(.035)	(.036)	(.037)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .108]*	*[.974, .721]*	*[.227, .048]*		*[.040, .572]*	*[.889, .202]*	*[.175, .169]*	
Pakistan								
Left Leaning	.235	.040	-.006	[.342]	.160	-.057	.011	[.064]
	(.035)	(.049)	(.048)		(.029)	(.036)	(.041)	
Centre Leaning	.658	.016	-.037	[.106]	.029	.010	.003	[.636]
	(.022)	(.031)	(.033)		(.008)	(.013)	(.012)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.688]*	*[.593]*		*[.000]*	*[.085]*	*[.854]*	
Right Leaning	.864	.021	-.032	[.269]	.058	-.045	-.047	[.889]
	(.042)	(.050)	(.057)		(.035)	(.036)	(.037)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.792, .935]*	*[.729, .933]*		*[.024, .418]*	*[.824, .155]*	*[.287, .193]*	
Nigeria								
Left Leaning	.240	.043	-.022	[.164]	.164	-.039	.014	[.171]
	(.035)	(.049)	(.048)		(.029)	(.038)	(.041)	
Centre Leaning	.683	-.005	-.061*	[.095]	.032	.013	-.004	[.209]
	(.022)	(.031)	(.033)		(.009)	(.014)	(.012)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.402]*	*[.507]*		*[.000]*	*[.203]*	*[.677]*	
Right Leaning	.850	.016	-.017	[.533]	.053	-.040	-.035	[.764]
	(.044)	(.056)	(.059)		(.034)	(.035)	(.036)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .001]*	*[.713, .743]*	*[.939, .511]*		*[.013, .543]*	*[.995, .167]*	*[.375, .420]*	
China								
Left Leaning	.260	.034	-.003	[.436]	.160	-.056	.018	[.043]
	(.036)	(.049)	(.049)		(.029)	(.036)	(.041)	
Centre Leaning	.637	.064**	-.068**	[.000]	.045	-.000	.012	[.461]
	(.023)	(.031)	(.034)		(.010)	(.015)	(.016)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.615]*	*[.279]*		*[.000]*	*[.151]*	*[.895]*	
Right Leaning	.806	-.008	-.016	[.901]	.058	-.028	-.015	[.658]
	(.047)	(.064)	(.064)		(.035)	(.040)	(.041)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .001]*	*[.596, .311]*	*[.874, .469]*		*[.025, .717]*	*[.591, .519]*	*[.572, .542]*	
Zimbabwe								
Left Leaning	.227	.040	-.037	[.091]	.170	-.039	.011	[.198]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.046)		(.029)	(.039)	(.041)	
Centre Leaning	.630	.015	-.060*	[.028]	.040	.003	.003	[.973]
	(.023)	(.032)	(.034)		(.010)	(.014)	(.014)	
C=L	*[.000]*	*[.666]*	*[.684]*		*[.000]*	*[.306]*	*[.848]*	
Right Leaning	.811	.027	.004	[.675]	.045	-.032	-.027	[.764]
	(.047)	(.058)	(.062)		(.033)	(.035)	(.036)	
R=L, R=C	*[.000, .000]*	*[.856, .863]*	*[.597, .365]*		*[.004, .884]*	*[.883, .353]*	*[.490, .446]*	


Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'; centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'; right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. Respondents who did not report a political leaning are excluded. The rows C=L and R=L, R=C report p-values on tests of equality of the coefficient across political-leaning groups. In the reduced outcome we combine respondents that answered 'reduced a lot' or 'reduced a little'. In the increased outcome we combine respondents that answered 'increased a lot' or 'increased a little'. Respondents could also answer 'remain the same' or 'don't know'.

Figure OC1: Discrimination Across Domains, by Political Leaning


Do you think that people from the following groups experience discrimination or harassment in … very often/often because of their ethnicity?




A. At work




B. By the police




C. In getting housing



D. In getting medical care



E. At school



F. On the street or in a public setting

Notes: Each panel reports, by political leaning, the share of respondents in the Control arm who think the group experiences discrimination or harassment 'very often' or 'often' in the domain, with 95% confidence intervals. Respondents could also answer 'sometimes', 'never' and 'don't know'; each respondent was asked about three of the six domains. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'; centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'; right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile.

Part OD: Heterogeneity by gender

Table OD1: Attitudes Towards Minorities, by Gender

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Ethnic diversity has a positive impact on life in the UK				
Baseline	.449	.001	.005	[.933]
	(.025)	(.035)	(.037)	
x Female	-.004	.009	.033	[.618]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.049)	
Racial discrimination in the UK is a big or moderate problem				
Baseline	.589	-.015	.012	[.465]
	(.025)	(.035)	(.037)	
x Female	.085**	.016	.065	[.298]
	(.033)	(.047)	(.047)	
The number of immigrants coming to the UK should be reduced				
Baseline	.692	.046	-.017	[.061]
	(.023)	(.031)	(.035)	
x Female	-.021	-.052	-.014	[.408]
	(.031)	(.043)	(.046)	
Government should reduce economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families				
Baseline	.460	-.027	.030	[.121]
	(.025)	(.035)	(.037)	
x Female	.054	.075	.036	[.429]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.049)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for men; the x Female rows report the differential for women. The dependent variables are dummies equal to one if the respondent answers ‘very positive’ or ‘fairly positive’ (ethnic diversity), ‘a big problem’ or ‘a moderate problem’ (racial discrimination), ‘reduced a lot’ or ‘reduced a little’ (immigration) and ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ (government policy), and zero otherwise (including ‘don't know’).

Table OD2: Which Groups are Minorities, by Gender

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Which of the following groups do you consider to be ethnic minorities?				
White British				
Baseline	.241	-.006	-.032	[.396]
	(.021)	(.030)	(.030)	
x Female	-.026	-.042	.012	[.177]
	(.028)	(.040)	(.040)	
Indian				
Baseline	.474	.086**	.025	[.097]
	(.025)	(.035)	(.037)	
x Female	-.026	-.026	.059	[.083]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.049)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	.492	.094***	.041	[.150]
	(.025)	(.035)	(.037)	
x Female	-.022	-.035	.046	[.102]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.049)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	.518	.028	.030	[.974]
	(.025)	(.035)	(.037)	
x Female	-.028	.001	.043	[.398]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.049)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for men; the x Female rows report the differential for women. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent selected the group as an ethnic minority.

Table OD3: Contribution to Society, by Gender

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Do you think the following groups generally make a positive or negative contribution to the UK? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 means 'very positive'.				
Indian				
Baseline	6.05	-.186	-.089	[.632]
	(.120)	(.180)	(.193)	
x Female	.165	.280	.188	[.725]
	(.179)	(.255)	(.261)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	4.99	-.155	-.081	[.736]
	(.144)	(.204)	(.219)	
x Female	.299	.477*	.364	[.691]
	(.201)	(.279)	(.289)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	5.56	-.110	-.133	[.913]
	(.137)	(.192)	(.211)	
x Female	.058	.370	.434	[.816]
	(.190)	(.263)	(.277)	
White British				
Baseline	7.45	-.123	-.209	[.586]
	(.102)	(.142)	(.161)	
x Female	-.239*	.009	.063	[.797]
	(.144)	(.199)	(.213)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for men; the x Female rows report the differential for women. Respondents answered on a scale where 0 means ‘very negative’ and 10 ‘very positive’; ‘not sure’ responses are excluded.

Table OD4: Opportunities, by Gender

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]	(7) Control Mean	(8) ΔNarrative of Success	(9) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[8 = 9]
Do the following groups have few or no opportunities to...where you live?												
		Get a good education				**Get a job**				**Earn a decent wage**		
White British												
Baseline	.076	.012	-.030	[.032]	.103	.027	-.027	[.023]	.160	.045	-.027	[.012]
	(.013)	(.020)	(.019)		(.014)	(.022)	(.022)		(.018)	(.028)	(.026)	
x Female	-.021	-.011	.009	[.389]	-.011	.016	.017	[.969]	-.006	-.007	.026	[.386]
	(.017)	(.025)	(.023)		(.020)	(.031)	(.029)		(.025)	(.037)	(.036)	
Indian												
Baseline	.106	-.025	-.003	[.290]	.138	-.006	.005	[.673]	.177	.033	.013	[.498]
	(.015)	(.020)	(.023)		(.017)	(.024)	(.027)		(.018)	(.028)	(.028)	
x Female	-.008	-.003	.013	[.594]	.000	.007	-.022	[.397]	.045*	-.046	-.015	[.439]
	(.021)	(.027)	(.031)		(.024)	(.034)	(.035)		(.027)	(.039)	(.039)	
Pakistani												
Baseline	.145	-.041*	.013	[.026]	.190	-.039	.008	[.085]	.261	-.026	-.020	[.834]
	(.017)	(.022)	(.026)		(.020)	(.026)	(.030)		(.022)	(.031)	(.031)	
x Female	-.029	.033	.014	[.566]	-.030	.048	-.012	[.105]	-.009	.026	.016	[.808]
	(.023)	(.031)	(.035)		(.027)	(.036)	(.039)		(.030)	(.042)	(.042)	
Black Caribbean												
Baseline	.157	-.001	.011	[.632]	.207	-.007	-.020	[.662]	.292	.018	-.030	[.139]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.026)		(.020)	(.028)	(.029)		(.023)	(.032)	(.032)	
x Female	-.007	-.022	-.000	[.537]	-.019	.005	-.000	[.880]	-.019	-.006	.032	[.394]
	(.024)	(.033)	(.035)		(.028)	(.038)	(.039)		(.031)	(.044)	(.044)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for men; the x Female rows report the differential for women. Respondents could answer each question with plenty, some, few or no opportunities, or don't know. We combine few and no opportunities for each outcome.

Table OD5: Luck vs Effort, by Gender

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
Does lack of effort or bad luck generally have more to do with whether a person from each of the following groups is unsuccessful?								
		Bad luck				**Lack of effort**		
White British								
Baseline	.085	.019	-.010	[.172]	.330	.020	.057	[.298]
	(.015)	(.021)	(.022)		(.023)	(.033)	(.035)	
x Female	-.023	-.019	-.001	[.475]	.018	.012	-.106**	[.012]
	(.018)	(.026)	(.026)		(.032)	(.046)	(.046)	
Indian								
Baseline	.245	.003	-.003	[.840]	.138	.028	.015	[.659]
	(.022)	(.030)	(.032)		(.017)	(.026)	(.027)	
x Female	-.009	-.025	.015	[.326]	-.020	-.044	-.054	[.779]
	(.029)	(.040)	(.042)		(.024)	(.034)	(.035)	
Pakistani								
Baseline	.182	.013	.006	[.788]	.220	.018	.040	[.508]
	(.020)	(.027)	(.030)		(.020)	(.029)	(.031)	
x Female	.010	-.004	.001	[.892]	-.067**	-.035	-.068*	[.398]
	(.027)	(.038)	(.039)		(.027)	(.038)	(.039)	
Black Caribbean								
Baseline	.183	-.022	.004	[.333]	.218	.043	.028	[.653]
	(.020)	(.027)	(.030)		(.020)	(.030)	(.031)	
x Female	-.017	.007	-.001	[.834]	-.042	-.064*	-.057	[.862]
	(.027)	(.036)	(.038)		(.028)	(.039)	(.040)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for men; the x Female rows report the differential for women. Respondents could answer the question with bad luck, a lack of effort, an equal mix of both or don't know.

Table OD6: Labor Market Discrimination, by Gender

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Imagine that the following men applied for a job, which they were qualified for. Please rank them based on how likely you think they would be to be turned down for the job.				
White British				
Baseline	2.200	.231	.007	[.142]
	(.099)	(.141)	(.152)	
x Female	-.495***	.049	.069	[.916]
	(.121)	(.176)	(.183)	
Indian				
Baseline	3.040	-.093	.122	[.050]
	(.071)	(.099)	(.112)	
x Female	.070	.014	.006	[.960]
	(.098)	(.136)	(.146)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	3.730	-.079	.175	[.032]
	(.084)	(.117)	(.121)	
x Female	.169	-.124	-.244	[.443]
	(.118)	(.159)	(.164)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	3.970	-.016	.006	[.870]
	(.092)	(.128)	(.135)	
x Female	.056	-.091	.063	[.379]
	(.123)	(.172)	(.178)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for men; the x Female rows report the differential for women. Respondents ranked six hypothetical men by how likely they would be to be turned down for a job they were qualified for; the outcome is the rank assigned to each group, recoded so that a higher value indicates a greater likelihood of being turned down. Respondents could assign the same rank to multiple groups, and answer ‘not sure’.

Table OD7: Equal Opportunities Policy, by Gender

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone too far or not gone far enough?								
		Not far enough				**Gone too far**		
White British								
Baseline	.261	.006	.043	[.260]	.032	.030**	.034**	[.845]
	(.021)	(.031)	(.033)		(.009)	(.015)	(.016)	
x Female	-.048	-.001	-.070*	[.100]	.009	-.021	-.021	[1.000]
	(.029)	(.041)	(.042)		(.012)	(.020)	(.021)	
Indian								
Baseline	.163	-.008	.011	[.465]	.202	.046	.032	[.661]
	(.018)	(.024)	(.027)		(.020)	(.030)	(.030)	
x Female	.033	.001	.044	[.240]	-.051*	-.030	-.064*	[.399]
	(.025)	(.034)	(.038)		(.027)	(.039)	(.039)	
Pakistani								
Baseline	.184	-.010	.021	[.267]	.259	.038	.012	[.436]
	(.019)	(.025)	(.029)		(.021)	(.031)	(.032)	
x Female	.037	.004	.025	[.593]	-.098***	-.019	-.030	[.804]
	(.026)	(.036)	(.039)		(.028)	(.040)	(.040)	
Black Caribbean								
Baseline	.229	.017	.011	[.841]	.235	.039	.016	[.479]
	(.020)	(.029)	(.031)		(.021)	(.030)	(.031)	
x Female	.014	.009	.061	[.215]	-.070**	-.039	-.049	[.808]
	(.028)	(.040)	(.041)		(.028)	(.040)	(.040)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for men; the x Female rows report the differential for women. Respondents could also answer the question with 'about right' or 'don't know'.

Table OD8: Perceived Graduate Shares, by Gende

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?				
Indian				
Baseline	.335	.005	-.019	[.152]
	(.011)	(.015)	(.017)	
x Female	.040***	.056***	.043*	[.542]
	(.015)	(.021)	(.023)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	.241	.007	-.035**	[.004]
	(.010)	(.014)	(.015)	
x Female	.037***	.060***	.040**	[.315]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	.184	-.004	-.018	[.232]
	(.007)	(.011)	(.011)	
x Female	.055***	.031**	.024	[.661]
	(.011)	(.016)	(.016)	
White British				
Baseline	.332	-.021*	-.023*	[.865]
	(.009)	(.012)	(.013)	
x Female	.058***	.022	.035*	[.485]
	(.013)	(.018)	(.018)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for men; the x Female rows report the differential for women. The dependent variable is the respondent's answer, as a share, to: Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?

Table OD9: Perceived Employment Rates, by Gender

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Out of 100 men of working age in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many would you say are working?				
White British				
Baseline	.756	.011	.006	[.754]
	(.009)	(.012)	(.016)	
x Female	-.064***	-.018	-.004	[.495]
	(.013)	(.017)	(.020)	
Indian				
Baseline	.802	.019	-.011	[.072]
	(.010)	(.014)	(.017)	
x Female	-.035**	-.001	.005	[.779]
	(.015)	(.019)	(.022)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	.774	.013	-.035*	[.007]
	(.010)	(.015)	(.018)	
x Female	-.028*	-.005	.025	[.199]
	(.015)	(.021)	(.024)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	.758	-.012	-.023	[.533]
	(.011)	(.015)	(.018)	
x Female	-.032**	.009	.010	[.953]
	(.015)	(.021)	(.023)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for men; the x Female rows report the differential for women. The dependent variable is the respondent's answer, as a share, to: Out of 100 men of working age in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many would you say are working?

Table OD10: Non-targeted Policies, by Gender

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
How much difference do you think the government could make in reducing inequalities between ethnic groups from the following actions?								
		Great deal/fair amount				**Not much/none**		
Investing more in education and training								
Baseline	.720	-.033	-.062*	[.431]	.200	.033	.043	[.775]
	(.023)	(.033)	(.035)		(.020)	(.030)	(.031)	
x Female	-.034	.107**	.141***	[.462]	-.028	-.046	-.080**	[.401]
	(.032)	(.045)	(.046)		(.027)	(.039)	(.039)	
Teach children more about British values								
Baseline	.528	.079**	.015	[.077]	.376	-.034	-.026	[.815]
	(.025)	(.035)	(.037)		(.024)	(.034)	(.036)	
x Female	-.025	-.016	.016	[.515]	-.028	.015	-.004	[.677]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.049)		(.033)	(.045)	(.047)	
Supported families with children more financially								
Baseline	.489	-.035	.004	[.285]	.398	.029	-.021	[.161]
	(.025)	(.035)	(.037)		(.024)	(.035)	(.036)	
x Female	.013	.091*	.075	[.742]	-.074**	-.050	-.023	[.568]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.049)		(.033)	(.046)	(.046)	
Increasing penalties for discriminating against groups								
Baseline	.443	-.044	-.006	[.296]	.445	.069**	.010	[.110]
	(.025)	(.034)	(.037)		(.025)	(.035)	(.037)	
x Female	.065*	.059	.031	[.560]	-.118***	-.057	-.013	[.347]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.049)		(.033)	(.046)	(.047)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for men; the x Female rows report the differential for women. The great deal/fair amount outcome combines 'a great deal of difference' and 'a fair amount of difference'; not much/none combines 'not much difference' and 'no difference at all'. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Table OD11: Immigration by Country of Origin, by Gender

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
The top five countries of origin of recent UK immigrants are India, Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. For each of these countries, do you think the number coming to the UK should be…								
		Reduced				**Increased**		
India								
Baseline	.556	.048	.017	[.391]	.068	-.035**	-.014	[.175]
	(.025)	(.034)	(.037)		(.013)	(.016)	(.018)	
x Female	.001	-.066	-.070	[.932]	-.026	.038*	.035	[.881]
	(.034)	(.047)	(.049)		(.016)	(.020)	(.022)	
Pakistan								
Baseline	.609	.067**	.018	[.162]	.063	-.029*	-.003	[.103]
	(.024)	(.033)	(.036)		(.013)	(.016)	(.019)	
x Female	-.017	-.084*	-.073	[.808]	-.015	.024	.003	[.305]
	(.033)	(.046)	(.048)		(.016)	(.020)	(.022)	
Nigeria								
Baseline	.635	.037	-.021	[.102]	.070	-.030*	-.015	[.337]
	(.024)	(.033)	(.036)		(.014)	(.017)	(.018)	
x Female	-.045	-.058	-.028	[.528]	-.025	.039*	.021	[.379]
	(.033)	(.046)	(.048)		(.016)	(.022)	(.022)	
China								
Baseline	.584	.082**	-.006	[.015]	.078	-.035**	.003	[.040]
	(.025)	(.034)	(.037)		(.014)	(.018)	(.021)	
x Female	.002	-.092**	-.049	[.374]	-.031*	.030	.009	[.357]
	(.034)	(.047)	(.049)		(.017)	(.022)	(.025)	
Zimbabwe								
Baseline	.593	.056*	-.021	[.031]	.070	-.027	-.005	[.186]
	(.024)	(.034)	(.037)		(.013)	(.017)	(.019)	
x Female	-.036	-.068	-.006	[.201]	-.015	.026	.004	[.300]
	(.034)	(.047)	(.049)		(.017)	(.022)	(.023)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for men; the x Female rows report the differential for women. In the reduced outcome we combine respondents that answered ‘reduced a lot’ or ‘reduced a little’. In the increased outcome we combine respondents that answered ‘increased a lot’ or ‘increased a little’. Respondents could also answer ‘remain the same’ or ‘don't know’.

Part OE: Heterogeneity by education

Table OE1: Attitudes Towards Minorities, by Education

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Ethnic diversity has a positive impact on life in the UK				
Baseline	.364	-.003	.014	[.561]
	(.020)	(.028)	(.028)	
x University Degree	.290***	.066	.029	[.444]
	(.035)	(.049)	(.050)	
Racial discrimination in the UK is a big or moderate problem				
Baseline	.604	-.013	.050*	[.029]
	(.021)	(.029)	(.029)	
x University Degree	.098***	.035	.003	[.514]
	(.035)	(.049)	(.049)	
The number of immigrants coming to the UK should be reduced				
Baseline	.774	.015	-.038	[.033]
	(.017)	(.023)	(.026)	
x University Degree	-.321***	-.015	.046	[.221]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.050)	
Government should reduce economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families				
Baseline	.441	-.008	.045	[.068]
	(.021)	(.029)	(.030)	
x University Degree	.163***	.092*	.022	[.165]
	(.036)	(.050)	(.051)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for education (distinguishing between those with and without a university degree). Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for respondents without a university degree; the x University Degree rows report the differential for those with one. The dependent variables are dummies equal to one if the respondent answers ‘very positive’ or ‘fairly positive’ (ethnic diversity), ‘a big problem’ or ‘a moderate problem’ (racial discrimination), ‘reduced a lot’ or ‘reduced a little’ (immigration) and ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ (government policy), and zero otherwise (including ‘don't know’).

Table OE2: Which Groups are Minorities, by Education

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Which of the following groups do you consider to be ethnic minorities?				
White British				
Baseline	.239	-.018	-.017	[.956]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)	
x University Degree	-.038	-.041	-.035	[.876]
	(.029)	(.040)	(.041)	
Indian				
Baseline	.401	.086***	.056*	[.301]
	(.020)	(.029)	(.029)	
x University Degree	.209***	-.029	-.002	[.594]
	(.035)	(.049)	(.051)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	.423	.089***	.069**	[.504]
	(.020)	(.029)	(.030)	
x University Degree	.202***	-.027	-.017	[.849]
	(.035)	(.049)	(.051)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	.450	.035	.051*	[.586]
	(.021)	(.029)	(.030)	
x University Degree	.188***	-.003	.000	[.943]
	(.035)	(.050)	(.051)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for education (distinguishing between those with and without a university degree). Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for respondents without a university degree; the x University Degree rows report the differential for those with one. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent selected the group as an ethnic minority.

Table OE3: Opportunities, by Education

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]	(7) Control Mean	(8) ΔNarrative of Success	(9) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[8 = 9]
Do the following groups have few or no opportunities to...where you live?												
		Get a good education				**Get a job**				**Earn a decent wage**		
White British												
Baseline	.071	.017	-.030**	[.002]	.097	.049**	-.008	[.004]	.161	.045*	-.008	[.022]
	(.010)	(.016)	(.014)		(.012)	(.019)	(.018)		(.016)	(.023)	(.022)	
x University Degree	-.016	-.046**	.013	[.005]	-.001	-.055*	-.036	[.526]	-.014	-.013	-.016	[.942]
	(.018)	(.023)	(.023)		(.021)	(.032)	(.029)		(.025)	(.038)	(.037)	
Indian												
Baseline	.109	-.024	.011	[.060]	.142	.002	.001	[.937]	.204	.004	.011	[.768]
	(.013)	(.017)	(.020)		(.015)	(.021)	(.022)		(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
x University Degree	-.023	-.014	-.025	[.704]	-.012	-.021	-.028	[.849]	-.014	.022	-.015	[.391]
	(.021)	(.027)	(.030)		(.025)	(.035)	(.035)		(.028)	(.042)	(.041)	
Pakistani												
Baseline	.140	-.026	.018	[.032]	.189	-.019	-.002	[.440]	.265	-.035	-.022	[.597]
	(.014)	(.019)	(.022)		(.017)	(.022)	(.024)		(.018)	(.025)	(.026)	
x University Degree	-.031	.003	.004	[.975]	-.046*	.010	.008	[.958]	-.030	.084*	.038	[.323]
	(.023)	(.031)	(.035)		(.026)	(.037)	(.038)		(.030)	(.045)	(.044)	
Black Caribbean												
Baseline	.147	.000	.029	[.187]	.201	.002	-.012	[.545]	.290	.007	-.021	[.282]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.022)		(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.019)	(.027)	(.027)	
x University Degree	.022	-.046	-.062*	[.652]	-.012	-.029	-.032	[.943]	-.026	.029	.026	[.950]
	(.026)	(.036)	(.037)		(.028)	(.040)	(.039)		(.032)	(.046)	(.046)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for education (distinguishing between those with and without a university degree). Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for respondents without a university degree; the x University Degree rows report the differential for those with one. Respondents could answer each question with plenty, some, few or no opportunities, or don't know. We combine few and no opportunities for each outcome.

Table OE4: Luck vs Effort, by Education

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
Does lack of effort or bad luck generally have more to do with whether a person from each of the following groups is unsuccessful?								
		Bad luck				**Lack of effort**		
White British								
Baseline	.073	.001	-.020	[.150]	.338	.025	-.007	[.258]
	(.011)	(.016)	(.015)		(.019)	(.028)	(.028)	
x University Degree	.003	.032	.028	[.884]	.003	.006	.023	[.725]
	(.019)	(.028)	(.027)		(.034)	(.049)	(.049)	
Indian								
Baseline	.222	-.028	.008	[.124]	.150	-.009	-.030	[.308]
	(.018)	(.023)	(.025)		(.016)	(.021)	(.022)	
x University Degree	.063**	.079*	-.012	[.045]	-.074***	.046	.053	[.850]
	(.031)	(.045)	(.045)		(.023)	(.033)	(.033)	
Pakistani								
Baseline	.160	.010	.010	[1.000]	.205	-.010	-.003	[.776]
	(.016)	(.022)	(.023)		(.017)	(.023)	(.024)	
x University Degree	.093***	.014	-.014	[.520]	-.062**	.032	.008	[.557]
	(.030)	(.043)	(.043)		(.027)	(.039)	(.039)	
Black Caribbean								
Baseline	.149	-.023	.013	[.078]	.225	-.009	-.017	[.738]
	(.016)	(.020)	(.022)		(.018)	(.024)	(.025)	
x University Degree	.089***	.024	-.036	[.141]	-.096***	.062	.042	[.621]
	(.029)	(.041)	(.041)		(.026)	(.039)	(.038)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for education (distinguishing between those with and without a university degree). Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for respondents without a university degree; the x University Degree rows report the differential for those with one. Respondents could answer the question with bad luck, a lack of effort, an equal mix of both or don't know.

Table OE5: Labor Market Discrimination, by Education

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Imagine that the following men applied for a job, which they were qualified for. Please rank them based on how likely you think they would be to be turned down for the job.				
White British				
Baseline	2.070	.286**	-.009	[.011]
	(.078)	(.111)	(.116)	
x University Degree	-.386***	-.199	.081	[.125]
	(.119)	(.174)	(.177)	
Indian				
Baseline	3.080	-.090	.145	[.007]
	(.063)	(.085)	(.092)	
x University Degree	-.019	.017	-.050	[.643]
	(.096)	(.137)	(.145)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	3.740	-.082	.088	[.072]
	(.075)	(.100)	(.102)	
x University Degree	.261**	-.180	-.120	[.714]
	(.115)	(.160)	(.167)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	3.910	-.059	.050	[.306]
	(.076)	(.105)	(.109)	
x University Degree	.303**	.024	-.036	[.744]
	(.128)	(.180)	(.184)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for education (distinguishing between those with and without a university degree). Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for respondents without a university degree; the x University Degree rows report the differential for those with one. Respondents ranked six hypothetical men by how likely they would be to be turned down for a job they were qualified for; the outcome is the rank assigned to each group, recoded so that a higher value indicates a greater likelihood of being turned down. Respondents could assign the same rank to multiple groups, and answer ‘not sure’.

Table OE6: Equal Opportunities Policy, by Education

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone too far or not gone far enough?								
		Not far enough				Gone too far		
White British								
Baseline	.257	.002	-.003	[.858]	.042	.021	.014	[.609]
	(.018)	(.025)	(.026)		(.008)	(.013)	(.012)	
x University Degree	-.067**	.005	.018	[.757]	-.017	-.006	.031	[.132]
	(.029)	(.041)	(.042)		(.012)	(.019)	(.022)	
Indian								
Baseline	.144	-.022	.031	[.009]	.207	.035	-.014	[.047]
	(.014)	(.019)	(.021)		(.017)	(.025)	(.024)	
x University Degree	.122***	.069	.020	[.276]	-.108***	-.031	.030	[.094]
	(.029)	(.042)	(.043)		(.025)	(.035)	(.036)	
Pakistani								
Baseline	.166	-.025	.035	[.004]	.236	.034	-.006	[.122]
	(.015)	(.020)	(.023)		(.018)	-.03	(.025)	
x University Degree	.128***	.082*	.001	[.075]	-.092***	-.037	-.011	[.513]
	(.030)	(.043)	(.045)		(.027)	(.039)	(.039)	
Black Caribbean								
Baseline	.191	.006	.053**	[.045]	.221	.029	-.006	[.163]
	(.016)	(.022)	(.024)		(.017)	(.025)	(.025)	
x University Degree	.155***	.079*	-.029	[.027]	-.072***	-.051	-.031	[.586]
	(.031)	(.046)	(.047)		(.028)	(.039)	(.038)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for education (distinguishing between those with and without a university degree). Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for respondents without a university degree; the x University Degree rows report the differential for those with one. Respondents could also answer the question with 'about right' or 'don't know'.

Table OE7: Contribution to Society, by Education

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Do you think the following groups generally make a positive or negative contribution to the UK? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 means 'very positive'.				
Indian				
Baseline	5.93	-.202	-.093	[.496]
	(.112)	(.158)	(.162)	
x University Degree	.716***	.647***	.380	[.285]
	(.171)	(.240)	(.251)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	4.86	-.048	.029	[.648]
	(.125)	(.169)	(.176)	
x University Degree	.941***	.541*	.302	[.406]
	(.197)	(.282)	(.284)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	5.30	.017	.046	[.858]
	(.118)	(.163)	(.171)	
x University Degree	1.03***	.252	.151	[.704]
	(.181)	(.252)	(.268)	
White British				
Baseline	7.42	-.118	-.178	[.631]
	(.091)	(.122)	(.130)	
x University Degree	-.321**	-.039	-.025	[.950]
	(.142)	(.204)	(.213)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for education (distinguishing between those with and without a university degree). Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for respondents without a university degree; the x University Degree rows report the differential for those with one. Respondents answered on a scale where 0 means ‘very negative’ and 10 ‘very positive’; ‘not sure’ responses are excluded.

Table OE8: Perceived Graduate Shares, by Education

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?				
Indian				
Baseline	.345	.025*	-.002	[.050]
	(.009)	(.013)	(.014)	
x University Degree	.035**	.037	.027	[.680]
	(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	.256	.025**	-.020*	[.000]
	(.009)	(.012)	(.012)	
x University Degree	.014	.051**	.031	[.382]
	(.014)	(.022)	(.021)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	.210	.002	-.012	[.159]
	(.007)	(.010)	(.010)	
x University Degree	.003	.042**	.035**	[.733]
	(.011)	(.017)	(.017)	
White British				
Baseline	.363	-.020*	-.009	[.338]
	(.008)	(.011)	(.012)	
x University Degree	-.010	.040**	.026	[.479]
	(.012)	(.018)	(.019)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for education (distinguishing between those with and without a university degree). Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for respondents without a university degree; the x University Degree rows report the differential for those with one. The dependent variable is the respondent's answer, as a share, to: Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?

Table OE9: Perceived Employment Rates, by Education

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Out of 100 men of working age in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many would you say are working?				
White British				
Baseline	.703	.005	-.000	[.649]
	(.008)	(.011)	(.013)	
x University Degree	.074***	-.009	.001	[.613]
	(.012)	(.018)	(.018)	
Indian				
Baseline	.756	.022*	-.001	[.068]
	(.010)	(.012)	(.014)	
x University Degree	.098***	-.006	-.032	[.191]
	(.013)	(.017)	(.021)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	.731	.015	-.016	[.031]
	(.010)	(.013)	(.015)	
x University Degree	.100***	-.006	-.028	[.313]
	(.013)	(.018)	(.023)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	.720	-.011	-.014	[.799]
	(.009)	(.013)	(.014)	
x University Degree	.076***	.020	-.018	[.081]
	(.015)	(.020)	(.023)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for education (distinguishing between those with and without a university degree). Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for respondents without a university degree; the x University Degree rows report the differential for those with one. The dependent variable is the respondent's answer, as a share, to: Out of 100 men of working age in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many would you say are working?

Table OE10: Non-targeted Policies, by Education

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
How much difference do you think the government could make in reducing inequalities between ethnic groups from the following actions?								
	Great deal/fair amount				**Not much/none**			
Investing more in education and training								
Baseline	.658	.020	.008	[.663]	.207	.016	.012	[.870]
	(.020)	(.028)	(.029)		(.017)	(.024)	(.025)	
x University Degree	.155***	.018	.018	[.987]	-.073***	-.033	-.049	[.667]
	(.031)	(.043)	(.045)		(.027)	(.038)	(.037)	
Teaching children more about British values								
Baseline	.564	.080***	.025	[.051]	.299	-.032	-.031	[.989]
	(.021)	(.028)	(.030)		(.019)	(.026)	(.027)	
x University Degree	-.170***	-.056	-.009	[.360]	.220***	.042	.003	[.436]
	(.035)	(.050)	(.051)		(.035)	(.050)	(.050)	
Supporting families with children more financially								
Baseline	.460	.005	.035	[.296]	.380	.011	-.027	[.184]
	(.021)	(.029)	(.030)		(.020)	(.028)	(.028)	
x University Degree	.122***	.038	.035	[.954]	-.067*	-.035	-.036	[.982]
	(.036)	(.051)	(.052)		(.034)	(.048)	(.048)	
Increasing penalties for discriminating against groups								
Baseline	.469	-.053*	-.010	[.135]	.379	.080***	.014	[.024]
	(.021)	(.029)	(.030)		(.020)	(.028)	(.029)	
x University Degree	.020	.155***	.081	[.153]	.026	-.156***	-.059	[.052]
	(.036)	(.051)	(.052)		(.035)	(.050)	(.050)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for education (distinguishing between those with and without a university degree). Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for respondents without a university degree; the x University Degree rows report the differential for those with one. The great deal/fair amount outcome combines ‘a great deal of difference’ and ‘a fair amount of difference’; not much/none combines ‘not much difference’ and ‘no difference at all’. Respondents could also answer ‘don't know’.

Table OE11: Immigration by Country of Origin, by Education

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
The top five countries of origin of recent UK immigrants are India, Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. For each of these countries, do you think the number coming to the UK should be…								
		Reduced				**Increased**		
India								
Baseline	.628	.012	-.022	[.228]	.039	-.015	.007	[.025]
	(.020)	(.028)	(.029)		(.008)	(.010)	(.012)	
x University Degree	-.250***	-.019	.003	[.665]	.059***	.001	-.014	[.590]
	(.035)	(.050)	(.050)		(.020)	(.028)	(.028)	
Pakistan								
Baseline	.674	.019	-.023	[.126]	.040	-.020**	-.006	[.097]
	(.020)	(.027)	(.028)		(.009)	(.010)	(.011)	
x University Degree	-.255***	-.007	.004	[.834]	.053***	.017	.013	[.888]
	(.035)	(.050)	(.051)		(.020)	(.028)	(.028)	
Nigeria								
Baseline	.688	.006	-.045	[.063]	.042	-.011	-.007	[.698]
	(.019)	(.026)	(.028)		(.009)	(.011)	(.011)	
x University Degree	-.265***	-.026	.024	[.323]	.053***	.008	.008	[.994]
	(.035)	(.050)	(.051)		(.020)	(.029)	(.028)	
China								
Baseline	.647	.033	-.033	[.019]	.046	-.020*	.003	[.034]
	(.020)	(.027)	(.029)		(.009)	(.011)	(.013)	
x University Degree	-.215***	-.015	.003	[.733]	.059***	.005	.011	[.824]
	(.035)	(.050)	(.051)		(.021)	(.029)	(.030)	
Zimbabwe								
Baseline	.654	.012	-.034	[.100]	.046	-.013	-.006	[.477]
	(.020)	(.027)	(.029)		(.009)	(.011)	(.012)	
x University Degree	-.274***	.005	.028	[.658]	.058***	.003	.008	[.860]
	(.035)	(.050)	(.050)		(.021)	(.030)	(.029)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a constant and treatment dummies fully interacted with a categorical variable for education (distinguishing between those with and without a university degree). Robust standard errors are reported. Baseline rows report estimates for respondents without a university degree; the x University Degree rows report the differential for those with one. In the reduced outcome we combine respondents that answered 'reduced a lot' or 'reduced a little'. In the increased outcome we combine respondents that answered 'increased a lot' or 'increased a little'. Respondents could also answer 'remain the same' or 'don't know'.

Part OF: Other minority groups (Polish, Black African)

Table OF1: Which Group is a Minority? Extended Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Narrative of Success	(3) Narrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Which of the following groups do you consider to be ethnic minorities?				
Asian:				
Indian	.461	.073***	.056**	[.493]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Pakistani	.481	.076***	.065***	[.644]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Bangladeshi	.503	.069***	.054**	[.542]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Black:				
Black Caribbean	.504	.029	.052**	[.350]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Black African	.493	.050**	.060**	[.675]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)	
BC = BA	*[.687]*	*[.572]*	*[.841]*	
White:				
White British	.228	-.027	-.027	[.974]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
Irish	.141	.014	.038**	[.163]
	(.011)	(.016)	(.017)	
WB = I	*[.470]*	*[.814]*	*[.719]*	
Polish	.318	.045**	.044*	[.959]
	(.016)	(.022)	(.023)	
WB = P	*[.461]*	*[.674]*	*[.687]*	
P = I	*[.030]*	*[.784]*	*[.962]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent selected the group as an ethnic minority.

Table OF2: Contribution to Society, All Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
On a scale of 0 to 10, do you think the following groups generally make a positive or negative contribution to the UK? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 means 'very positive'.				
Polish	6.37	-.023	.182	[.103]
	(.080)	(.121)	(.118)	
Black African	5.46	-.027	.107	[.315]
	(.094)	(.132)	(.134)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Respondents answered on a scale where 0 means ‘very negative’ and 10 ‘very positive’; ‘not sure’ responses are excluded.

Table OF3: Perceived Graduate Shares, Other Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) QLFS	(2) Control Mean	[1 = 2]	(3) ΔNarrative of Success	(4) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[3 = 4]
Out of 100 men/women above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?						
Men						
Polish	.309	.222	[.000]	.010	.016*	[.501]
		(.006)		(.008)	(.008)	
WB = P		*[.477]*		*[.942]*	*[.952]*	
Black African	.575	.232	[.000]	.019**	-.001	[.027]
		(.006)		(.009)	(.009)	
BC = BA		*[.846]*		*[.968]*	*[.997]*	
Women						
Polish	.473	.228	[.000]	.010	.003	[.398]
		(.006)		(.009)	(.009)	
WB = P		*[.386]*		*[.957]*	*[.999]*	
Black African	.570	.209	[.000]	.024***	-.002	[.004]
		(.006)		(.009)	(.009)	
BC = BA		*[.917]*		*[.949]*	*[.970]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Column 1 reports minority group estimates constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from January 2023 - December 2024; the bracketed p-value tests the control mean against it.

Table OF4: Perceived Employment Rates, Other Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) 1 - Unem. rate	(1b) Share working	(2) Control Mean	[1b = 2]	(4) ΔNarrative of Success	(5) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[4 = 5]
Out of 100 men/women of working age in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many would you say are working?							
Men							
Polish	.975	.887	.797	[.000]	.002	.005	[.770]
			(.007)		(.009)	(.010)	
WB = P			*[.670]*		*[.997]*	*[.987]*	
Black African	.935	.842	.734	[.000]	.004	-.019*	[.036]
			(.008)		(.010)	(.012)	
BC = BA			*[.932]*		*[.932]*	*[.997]*	
Women							
Polish	.980	.868	.748	[.000]	-.001	-.008	[.553]
			(.007)		(.011)	(.011)	
WB = P			*[.812]*		*[.987]*	*[.965]*	
Black African	.929	.763	.680	[.000]	.008	-.008	[.203]
			(.009)		(.012)	(.012)	
BC = BA			*[.868]*		*[.969]*	*[.963]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Columns 1 and 1b report minority group estimates constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from January 2023 - December 2024; the bracketed p-value tests the control mean against column 1b.

Table OF5: Opportunities, Other Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]	(7) Control Mean	(8) ΔNarrative of Success	(9) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[8 = 9]
Do the following groups have few or no opportunities to...where you live?												
		Get a good education				**Get a job**				**Earn a decent wage**		
Polish	.105	.002	.025	[.139]	.132	.002	-.017	[.235]	.222	.016	-.000	[.417]
	(.010)	(.015)	(.016)		(.012)	(.017)	(.017)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
WB = P	*[.792]*	*[.985]*	*[.816]*		*[.758]*	*[.846]*	*[.995]*		*[.378]*	*[.819]*	*[.910]*	
Black African	.161	-.018	.004	[.224]	.198	-.005	-.022	[.361]	.283	.008	-.011	[.375]
	(.013)	(.017)	(.018)		(.014)	(.019)	(.019)		(.015)	(.022)	(.022)	
BC = BA	*[.898]*	*[.943]*	*[.925]*		*[.995]*	*[.996]*	*[.984]*		*[.970]*	*[.887]*	*[.939]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Respondents could answer each question with plenty, some, few or no opportunities, or don't know. We combine few and no opportunities for each outcome.

Table OF6: Luck vs Effort, Other Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	Luck vs Effort Control Means [1] = [5]	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(5) Control Mean	(6) ΔNarrative of Success	(7) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[6 = 7]
Does lack of effort or bad luck generally have more to do with whether a person from each of the following groups is unsuccessful?									
			Bad luck				**Lack of Effort**		
Polish	[.000]	.270	-.008	.007	[.476]	.107	.005	.004	[.970]
		(.015)	(.021)	(.022)		(.010)	(.015)	(.016)	
WB = P		*[.167]*	*[.931]*	*[.923]*		*[.030]*	*[.895]*	*[.979]*	
Black African	[.036]	.166	-.015	.022	[.040]	.205	.005	-.002	[.698]
		(.013)	(.017)	(.019)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
BC = BA		*[.901]*	*[.967]*	*[.843]*		*[.901]*	*[.956]*	*[.972]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Respondents could answer the question with bad luck, a lack of effort, an equal mix of both or don't know.

Table OF7: Labor Market Discrimination, Other Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

		(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]
Imagine that the following men applied for a job, which they were qualified for. Please rank them based on how likely you think they would be to be turned down for the job.					
Polish		2.99	.172**	-.065	[.002]
		(.056)	(.077)	(.077)	
	WB = P	*[.000]*	*[.125]*	*[.080]*	
Black African		4.01	-.126	.045	[.050]
		(.060)	(.085)	(.088)	
	BC = BA	*[.641]*	*[.018]*	*[.939]*	
Imagine that the following women applied for a job, which they were qualified for. Please rank them based on how likely you think they would be to be turned down for the job.					
Polish		3.00	-.043	-.117	[.335]
		(.059)	(.079)	(.081)	
	WB = P	*[.000]*	*[.000]*	*[.000]*	
Black African		3.91	-.052	.028	[.357]
		(.061)	(.084)	(.089)	
	BC = BA	*[.000]*	*[.380]*	*[.311]*	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Respondents ranked six hypothetical men (women) by how likely they would be to be turned down for a job they were qualified for; the outcome is the rank assigned to each group, recoded so that a higher value indicates a greater likelihood of being turned down. Respondents could assign the same rank to multiple groups, and answer ‘not sure’.

Table OF8: Equal Opportunities Policy, Other Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ΔNarrative of Success	(3) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) ΔNarrative of Success	(6) ΔNarrative of Disadvantage	[5 = 6]
Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone too far or not gone far enough?								
		Not far enough				**Gone too far**		
Polish	.166	.004	.020	[.377]	.095	.031**	-.005	[.030]
	(.012)	(.017)	(.018)		(.010)	(.016)	(.015)	
WB = P	*[.490]*	*[.994]*	*[.912]*		*[.693]*	*[.961]*	*[.911]*	
Black African	.235	.013	.047**	[.106]	.215	.013	-.021	[.088]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.021)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
BC = BA	*[.961]*	*[.837]*	*[.969]*		*[.610]*	*[.916]*	*[.871]*	


Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results of each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Respondents could also answer the question with ‘about right’ or ‘don't know’.

Figure OF1: Perceived Economic Outcomes, Other Groups

A. Men




A. Graduate Shares




B. Employment Shares


B. Women



A. Graduate Shares



B. Employment Shares



Notes: Each panel reports means for respondents in the Control arm with 95% confidence intervals, and the estimates constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from January 2023 - December 2024. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile.